The Gift in the Iliad by Jordan, Tyler
Western University 
Scholarship@Western 
Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 
7-16-2020 11:00 AM 
The Gift in the Iliad 
Tyler Jordan, The University of Western Ontario 
Supervisor: Stocking, Charles H., The University of Western Ontario 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in 
Classics 
© Tyler Jordan 2020 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd 
 Part of the Classical Literature and Philology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jordan, Tyler, "The Gift in the Iliad" (2020). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 7166. 
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/7166 
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.ca. 
 
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this thesis I challenge the dominant conception of gift giving in the 
Iliad. In Chapter 1 I show that the textual evidence does not support the 
idea that different categories of gift giving are denoted by word choice. 
In Chapter 2, I show that modern theories are not able to explain 
perfectly the instances of gift giving in the Iliad. Furthermore, I show 
that the use or avoidance of gift terms in the poem can carry meaning. 
In Chapter 3, I take the conclusions from the previous two chapters and 
apply them to a focused analysis of the exchange between Diomedes and 
Glaukos in Iliad 6, showing that the language of the scene can allow us 
to analyse the exchange as more than only an instance of gift giving.  
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE 
 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the act of gift giving in the epic poem the 
Iliad, the oldest surviving piece of ‘Western’ literature, which tells part 
of the story of the Trojan War.  
Since the publication of Marcel Mauss’ structuralist interpretation of 
gift giving in 1925, scenes of gift giving in the Iliad have been analysed 
in a reductionist manner, with some believing that every gift serves the 
purpose of negotiating status between donor and recipient. I argue, 
instead, that the language of the poem resists such a universalising 
interpretation.    
Relying on a close reading of the text, I analyse the vocabulary 
associated with object exchange in a number of scenes in the Iliad. I 
focus in particular on the armour exchange between the Greek hero 
Diomedes and the Trojan hero Glaukos in Book 6. I show that the 
language of this scene differs from all other instances of gift exchange in 
the poem. This suggests, on the one hand, that the scene cannot 
uncritically be interpreted as that of gift giving, and, on the other hand, 
that this problematizes the universality of anthropological gift theory. 
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A NOTE ON THE TEXT 
 
 
All translations to be found in this thesis are the author’s own,  
unless otherwise noted. The transliteration used throughout for Greek 
follows the Library of Congress system. The transliteration of Russian 
follows the Scientific transliteration of Cyrillic system.   
 In the majority of cases, the text of the original language is supplied 
in the body or footnotes along with the translation, and important 
elements of quoted passages are underlined in both the original and in 
English translation. 
The Latin-based text of this thesis is set in Adobe Caslon Pro, a 
typeface designed by Carol Twombly for Adobe based on eighteenth 
century specimens originally designed by William Caslon.* Greek and 
Cyrillic text is set in Minion Pro, designed, also for Adobe, by Robert 
Slimbach and based on late Renaissance types. The sans-serif titling is 
set in Myriad Pro, a humanist typeface designed by both Twombly and 
Slimbach, once again for Adobe. 
 
 
* For a brief overview of the history of Caslon, see Lawson 1990: ch.15. 
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Жизнь ведь тоже только миг,†  
After all, life is but a moment too, 
Только растворенье  
Only dissolution 
Нас самих во всех других 
Of ourselves in everybody else  
Как бы им в даренье. 
Like the giving of a gift.‡ 
 
 
Ты отдал мне не тот подарок, 
You gave me not that gift, 
Который издалека вез. 
Which from far away you brought. 
Казался он пустой забавой 
To you, it seemed an empty amusement 
В тот вечер огненный тебе. 
On that fiery evening.  
И стал он медленной отравой 
And it became a slow poison 
В моей загадочной судьбе. 
In my mysterious destiny. 
И он всех бед моих предтеча, —  
And it was the precursor of all my misfortunes, — 
Не будем вспоминать о нем!.. 
We will not think about it!...§ 
 
 
† The Cyrillic and interlinear Latin text of these epigraphs is set in Garamond Premier 
Pro, a typeface designed by Robert Slimbach for Adobe, based on the sixteenth century 
type designed by Claude Garamond (see Lawson 1990: ch.10 for a historical account). 
‡ Doctor Zhivago, ch.17 (from the poem “Свадьба”, “Wedding”). The final line follows 
the translation in Pevear and Volokhonsky 2010. 
§ Anna Akhmatova 1956 (poem 9 in the cycle “шиповник цветет”, “The Sweetbriar 
Blooms”).	The poem’s text is from Akhmatova 1990: 250. 
 
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
ince the publication of Mauss’ influential article L’essai sur le 
don, gift theory has been heavily dependent on the conclusions 
drawn from his research.1 Since then, succeeding 
anthropologists have been arguing against some of the conclusions 
reached by Mauss, but still ultimately focus on the politico-economic 
conclusions which are present in the Essai. Unfortunately, classicists 
have tended not to follow the trail of criticism of Mauss: following M. 
I. Finley’s The World of Odysseus, scholars are seemingly content to 
assume Mauss’ conclusions of obligation and reciprocity and total 
prestations. Nowhere else in Classics is this more evident than in 
Homeric studies. Indeed, many classicists go beyond simple theory and 
 
1 This is not to say, however, that before Mauss, the gift and gift giving were not a 
subject of concern for authors. Aristotle (Nic. Eth. 1136b5–10), as we will see below, 
had already begun to make some observations about the effects of giving on one’s status 
or honour. In his Notes from a Dead House (1.10 [1860–2]), Dostoevsky too makes his 
own observations about the altered state of gift giving at Christmas in his prison: “Всё 
принималось с одинаковою благодарностью, без различия даров и 
даривших.” (“All was accepted with identical gratitude, without the distinction of 
gifts and givers”). We also find in Pushkin’s The Captain’s Daughter a commentary on 
Slavic gift giving practices (Bethea 2009: ch.12). Even though these authors are 
engaging with important theoretical issues in gift giving, they lack the sense of 
sustained enquiry which we find in Mauss and his successors. 
S 
 
 
2 
attempt to create not only ‘Homeric’ economies from the Homeric 
poems, but entire ‘Homeric’ anthropologies, a practice which goes back 
to antiquity. For, as Snodgrass writes, “the belief that the social system 
portrayed in the Homeric poems…[is] in large measure both unitary 
and historical…has been alive since Classical times.”2 This practice, I 
believe, fails on a number of levels. The creation of a full or partial 
anthropology for a society which we cannot observe—and even through 
observation there arise numerous problems: namely, as Levi-Strauss 
writes, the observer will only ever be able to understand the foreign 
practices subjectively3—is highly problematic, and all the more so for a 
society for which our data consists only of two poems and comparatively 
little archaeological remains.4 The two pieces of writing (the Iliad and 
the Odyssey) on which scholars, out of necessity, usually rely in their 
anthropologies, are also problematic. Composed traditionally from oral-
poetic formulae and stories over centuries and in different regions, these 
writings cannot be assumed to reflect a ‘society’ or ‘culture’ that ever 
existed in one time or one place. This problem, however, does not stop 
 
2 Snodgrass 1974: 114. 
3 Levi-Strauss 1997: 49–51. See also Bourdieu 1977: ch.1. 
4 This is not to take a stand on the relative chronology of the Homeric epics and 
Hesiod, but rather only that the Hesiodic poems depict a world which is different from 
the Homeric Iliad and Odyssey. See West 2006 for an argument that dates Hesiod 
before the Homeric epics.  
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scholars from writing about the ‘Homeric’ economy, or even ‘Homeric’ 
culture in general. No one who sets out to write a comprehensive 
cultural study of 19th century Russia would be able to create an accurate 
cultural history using as their sources only Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment and Gogol’s Dead Souls: they are pieces of fiction, just like 
Homeric poetry: idealised, full of generic tropes, which is an even bigger 
problem for Homer than for Dostoevsky and Gogol given the 
limitations of oral composition. Indeed, this point is made especially 
clear in Auerbach’s Mimesis, which shows that the modes by which an 
author represents reality are neither uniform nor do they necessarily 
portray an accurate representation of reality.5 That is not to say that 
nothing in Homer reflects some society (or societies) which did in fact 
exist, even if not at the same time or same place.6 
This study, then, will not claim to offer an account of ‘Homeric’ gift 
exchange reflecting some inauthentic society, nor even an account of 
 
5 Auerbach 2003. We find in Auerbach’s selection reality being subservient to the goals 
of the author. Even though, arguably, reality is the same for Homer and Virginia 
Woolf, the way they both choose to represent it is extremely different. See, however, 
de Beauvoir 2011 for an existentialist account of realism in literature.  
6 e.g. Seaford 1994: 6, “although Homeric epic does not give us a photograph of an 
actual society, neither is it merely an ideological construction… The proportions in 
which it reflects reality or ideology are impossible to know;” Martindale 1993: 48, 
“…all texts are only texts, and that none gives us unmediated access to ‘reality’ or ‘the 
truth’”; and Figes 2002: 104 “no novel is a direct window on to life and… we cannot 
take these observations as an accurate reflection of reality.” 
 
 
4 
Iliadic gift exchange, as it obtains within the poem itself. For as we will 
see, the data from the poem itself makes this extremely difficult. Instead, 
my goal is to explore how the language used can convey nuances which 
seem to be lost in scholars’ tendencies to abstract,7 or in the reading of 
the poem with the assumption of some form of Maussian exchange 
being at work. Ultimately, I am pursuing an aesthetic reading of gifts in 
the Iliad. A word about this term ‘aesthetic’: in using this term I have in 
mind an approach to the text which is rooted in the poetic qualities of 
the text, such as the approach for which John Miles Foley advocates, 
discussed below. I do not use ‘aesthetic’ as a philosophical term here; 
thus ‘aesthetic’ can be read as equivalent to a term such as ‘poetic’.  
This thesis will aim to approach gift giving from a literary point-of-
view. In recent decades there has been a trend to politicise literature, 
which is to say, to read literature not so much on aesthetic grounds, but 
on underlying political grounds.8 I do not wish to argue against political 
readings, since works of art (regardless of in what medium they are 
composed) are part of a larger political culture, and no doubt do make 
use of political or ideological realities, but I do wish to illustrate the 
problems which arise from the sort of purely reductionist political 
 
7 By which I mean the tendency of theorists to abstract textual or observational 
evidence into an underlying theory.  
8 Aubry 2018: 1–9. 
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readings which seem to have been popular. For example, Donlan and 
van Wees both seem to believe that gifs in the Iliad (and more generally 
in Homer) serve political and/or economic ends.9 Paradoxically, the 
recent trend of reading literature politically has resulted in less emphasis 
being placed upon the poem’s words, for what is literature without 
language? Ultimately, I hope to advance novel readings of gift giving 
scenes which have heretofore been understood merely on political bases. 
 It will be beneficial here to briefly offer a justification and description 
of the methodological apparatus for the approach I will be taking, for it 
presupposes that the Iliad is a work of verbal art. This is not a universally 
accepted position. For example, in discussing to charge of mechanism 
in the Homeric poems, Foley writes that “many critics have voiced 
essentially the same objection: the attractive hypothesis of an oral poet’s 
ready-made diction and narrative patterns simply leaves no room for 
verbal art.”10 This view seems to pose problems not just for the artistic 
consideration of poetry composed in oral traditions (regardless of 
language), but for art as a whole until very recently. Indeed, all forms of 
art have traditionally been bound to a series of rules restricting the 
‘freedom’ of the artists’ expression.11 For example, in music, classical 
 
9 Donlan 1997: 663. van Wees 1992.  
10 Foley 1997: 164. See also Foley 1999: ch.1.  
11 Of course, there are problems when defining ‘art’ with a set of necessary conditions. 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘art’ as we use it today, so as to mean ‘fine art(s)’ is a 
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Western compositions were, until modern experiments of tonality, 
bound by strict rules of composition, but composers are and were able 
to create unique works of art within the ruleset imposed upon them. 
Similarly, traditional ‘literature’ was also bound to the rules of language 
and genre (until again the 20th century experimentalists such as James 
Joyce or Virginia Woolf began to deviate in terms of use of language 
and/or generic constraint). In effect, critics have argued that the Oral 
Theory of composition seems to reduce the entire work to a series of 
necessary formulaic reči.12 In addition to the above defence of rule-
governed art, I side with Foley, who argues that formulaic phrases, 
following his theory of traditional referentiality, are more than simply 
metrically-necessary stop-gaps.13 Instead, formulae are used to refer not 
just to the exact lexical meaning of the formula, but to evoke “‘the entire 
heroic portrayal, complete with its mythic history and contradictions, as 
 
modern phenomenon, and whether or something can be retroactively declared art is 
debated. See, e.g. Crownther 2004; Wilson 2018.  
12 From a Slavic root bearing meaning associated with speech. Cf. Pr.Slav. *rečь, 
‘speech’ which provides reflexes in all branches of Slavic (Derksen 2007: s.v. *rečь). For 
the meaning of it in the context of South Slavic orally-composed poetry, see Foley 
1997: 151–159, who argues that reči are poetic morphemes, somewhat equivalent to 
linguistic morphemes, i.e. they are the smallest unit of meaning, and can range from 
single words to entire story patterns in the minds of the South Slavic guslars.  
13 In fact, Nagy (1974: ch.3) argues that the formulae helped to condition the epic 
metre (in particular the substitutions of dactyls and spondees), seeming to suggest that 
the argument of metrical necessity is perhaps backward.  
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known to the tradition and as signalled by this phrase.’”14 Foley goes on 
to show that this interpretation of formulae is applicable not just to 
noun-epithet formulae, but “to the phraseology as a whole,” meaning 
that formulaic descriptions and entire scene-types also bear this capacity 
of traditional referentiality.15 This theory is enhanced when we consider 
Bakker’s scale of interformularity, which he uses to argue for a more 
nuanced interpretation of formulaic phrases based on their rate of 
appearance, with lesser-used phrases being more highly imbued with 
meaning.16 Ultimately, what these approaches to Homeric poetry allow 
us to do is interpret the poems (the epics and the hymns, and even later 
literature engaging in reception of these texts) as aesthetic compositions, 
allowing us to read the words and formulae as meaningful instead of 
merely being metrical necessities.  
 In approaching the text this way, I am not claiming that a political 
reading of the poem (or of any piece of literature or art more generally) 
is invaluable or secondary to an aesthetic reading of the text. In fact, the 
relationship between politics and aesthetics is well discussed in 
 
14 Foley 1997: 167–168. His quotation is referring specifically to the formulaic epithet 
“swift-footed Achilles”, but is applicable to any epithet. 
15 Foley 1997: 168. Foley (1997: 168–169) discusses briefly the two descriptive 
formulae hypodra idôn (‘looking darkly’) and pukinon epos (‘intimate word’) as examples. 
16 See Bakker 2013: 157–169 for a full account of his theory. 
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philosophy.17 What I do wish to do, however, is add another dimension 
to the interpretation of gifts in the Iliad (and I believe that such an 
approach will be beneficial to other literature as well), for the dominant 
approach in the scholarship is to read scenes of gift exchange as political 
or economic.18 I draw attention away from the political aspect of the 
phenomenon of gift exchange and toward the language and poetic 
context of scenes of gift exchange in order to illustrate the added 
interpretive benefit of such an approach. 
 The focus of this research has been limited to the Homeric epic poem 
the Iliad. There are many reasons for limiting the study to only a single 
text. To begin, the poem itself provides us with an abundance of data 
for analysis: expanding the study even to both of the Homeric epics 
would prove to be too much material for the present study. (Although 
the Odyssey, along with other archaic poetry, and even later works of 
prose, will inevitably play a part in our discussion). Furthermore, based 
on the textual idiosyncrasies that exist between the Iliad and the Odyssey 
it seems best to treat only a single work in a study so heavily based on 
 
17 This relationship is especially present in the work of Jacques Rancière (e.g. Rancière 
2011 and Rancière 2019). See also Bottici 2019 for a discussion of the imaginal nature 
of politics. 
18 There are some analyses of the Diomedes-Glaukos exchange which read the scene 
in a poetic context rather than strictly politically; these are discussed below (ch.3). 
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the language of the received text.19 For following modern semantic 
theory, each speaker of a language will have certain variances in their 
internal understanding of what a certain word means, therefore 
including both the Iliad and the Odyssey in this study would only serve 
to undermine the unity of the project.20 To illustrate this point, we can 
consider the differing formulaic patterns between each of the poems, 
which to me is indicative of the works belonging to separate traditions.21 
We can add to this the argument that the word mythos has a different 
meaning in the Odyssey than in the Iliad,22 suggesting that cross-poem 
semantic analyses are problematic if they aim at a universalising 
conclusion. 
In Chapter One, following the work of Émile Benveniste, I will apply 
a strictly philological approach to the text.23 Namely, I will examine 
individual gift terms used throughout the poem for what Benveniste 
claims to be different aspects of gift giving, and, in doing so, I aim to 
 
19 The fiercely debated ‘Homeric Question’ will largely be left to the side for the 
purposes of this study. For a sustained argument for the composition of the Iliad by a 
single poet over a prolonged period of time, see West 2011 (and West 2013 for an 
argument of the same style about the Odyssey). See Edmunds 2016: 5–7 for a very brief 
overview of Nagy’s and West’s disagreement.  
20 Martindale 1993: 88. “…no two users of the ‘same’ language use names, or words in 
general, identically, since the field of meaning will vary in each case.” 
21 This problem of interpretation is further compounded if we assume that the poems 
have been composed by a number of bards over a long period of time.  
22 Clark 2001.  
23 Benveniste 1997. 
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illustrate the problems which arise when we begin to discuss the text 
with a preconceived notion of gift exchange theory. Instead, I will argue 
that the individual words which Benveniste chooses to discuss are, on 
etymological grounds, on oral-poetic grounds, and on contextual 
grounds, incapable of denoting specific types of gifts. Expanding beyond 
the handful of Greek nouns which Benveniste analyses, I include a 
selection of additional adjectives and verbs which further serve to show 
that analyses must be carried out with as little bias for a specific 
underlying structure of gift giving as possible.  
 My justification for spending so much time on the philological data 
of a typically theoretical or anthropological field is that the text being 
studied is itself dependant on language. The scholarship concerning the 
composition of the Iliad is voluminous, but, regardless of the original 
method of composition, the text we have and are working with is a fixed 
text. Thus, a great focus will be placed on the words which are preserved 
by the text.24 Unlike Mauss’ study, which was based upon data obtained 
from first-person observation by integrating into the target society, 
enquiring about, and participating in the society’s practices, we must 
 
24 For various arguments concerning the composition of the Iliad, see: West 2011; 
Lord 1964; Turner 1997. 
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first be concerned with the language of the poem.25 Only after 
establishing the nuances of language used for the various aspects of gift 
giving can we begin to approach the poem from a theoretic-
anthropological position. An example to illustrate the necessity of 
having a sound philological grounding before considering the 
theoretical and practical aspects of gift giving can be found in Richmond 
Lattimore’s English translation of the Iliad. Although generally 
considered to be a standard translation of the Iliad, there are numerous 
instances where Lattimore has translated the same Greek word with 
different English words, or where he has departed from the original 
Greek and supplied the word ‘gift’ where the Greek itself is silent: one 
example, for instance Lattimore translates the same word, dôra as both 
‘favours’ and ‘gifts’ at Il. 3.64–65.26 In order to avoid making the mistake 
of considering as a gift something that is not a gift, or the opposite, it is 
necessary to examine thoroughly the language of the text. 
 Following the philological investigation, we will concern ourselves 
with the practical nature of gift giving. That is to say, we will look at 
 
25 Although, as we will see below, Mauss is criticized by later scholars for his 
misunderstanding of textual data. See, e.g. Levi-Strauss 1997, Sahlins 2017: 134–167. 
26 For more examples (inexhaustive), see also Lattimore 2011: 9.261 (dôra as 
‘recompense’); 21.165 (dôra omitted); 23.559–562 (Lattimore writes ‘gift’ where Greek 
merely says ‘something of great value’ ‘πολέος δέ οἱ ἄξιος ἔσται’); 24.502 (apoina 
‘ransom’ translated as ‘gifts’). 
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selected instances of gift giving in the text of the poem, paying attention 
to both those things explicitly called gifts and those things which are 
merely said to have been given by someone to another. My hope in this 
section is to illustrate the aesthetic qualities which arise from reading 
the scenes of giving with an attention to the language used. Especially 
important for this section will be Donna Wilson’s work on Book 9 of 
the Iliad, which provides us with an exceptional analysis of the poetic 
distinction between poinê and apoina, which ultimately shows, I believe, 
that the specific language used by the poet or characters in the poem is 
meaningful.27 With respect to force terms, Stocking writes that ““The 
very fact of the multiplicity of force terms makes it such that the use of 
biê in Nestor’s speech to designate “force” is itself marked. Metrical 
arguments aside, we must consider why biê is used in Nestor’s speech 
and not one of the other many force terms.”28 I believe that the same 
logic may be used in our case here, since the gift terms are often used in 
place of another, perhaps more fitting, term such as geras, apoina, etc., 
which seems to suggest that the use of dôra, xenêion, or dôtinê, is marked. 
We will also see that the notion of a gift seems to be highly problematic 
in the poem: often things described as gifts do not conform to the 
 
27 Wilson 1999.  
28 Stocking (forthcoming). See Newton 2009 for a discussion of the guest-gift and 
geras being used in such a manner. 
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notions of what a gift is in modern theory, but many things which are 
clearly not gifts are nevertheless described as such. Ultimately, I argue 
that the very use (or disuse) of a word meaning gift is important in the 
interpretation of the scene in question. 
 Lastly, following the groundwork laid in the first two chapters, we 
will apply the methodology to the famous exchange between Diomedes 
and Glaukos in Book 6 of the Iliad. This chapter aims to make use of 
the approach taken in the first two chapters and offer a sustained 
argument and example of the benefits of pursuing a reading with close 
attention paid to the language of the scene. Therefore, this chapter puts 
forth a novel reading of the scene by approaching it from an altogether 
new angle and drawing linguistic comparisons to other scenes both 
within the Iliad, with other hexameter poetry, and with later Greek 
literature.  
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1 
PHILOLOGY 
 
 
 
he Iliad survives as a text. The exact manner, however, in 
which the poem was composed remains a debate in the 
current scholarly literature.29 It is out of the scope of this 
thesis to argue about the origins of the Iliad which we possess, but the 
fact that we are working with a piece of literature is important for the 
approach which will be undertaken.  
 In this section I aim to examine thoroughly the language of gift giving 
in the Iliad. In so doing, I am following the example of Benveniste in 
examining the semantic differences (if there be any) between the 
different words the poet uses to denote a ‘gift’.30 Although I will refer to 
a ‘poet’ of the Iliad here and elsewhere, it is necessary to keep in mind 
the large body of oral-formulaic traditional material out of which the 
 
29 The two general sides of this debate are between those who believe the poem to be 
orally composed from a long tradition with material coming from many bards, while 
the other end of the spectrum argues that a single poet composed the poem with the 
aid of writing. Ultimately, it seems to me that some combination of the two extremes 
is most likely. For the Oral school, see e.g. Lord 1964, Nagy 1996. For the other side, 
see West 2011.  
30 Benveniste 1948–49.  
T 
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finalised Iliad was composed. This large body of traditional material is 
responsible for the various formulaic phrases which make up the poem.31 
In addition to the consideration afforded to the word choices made by 
the ‘poet’, discussion will also include consideration for how specific 
word choice might evoke for the audience a certain response. For as John 
Miles Foley argues, the audience is an important part of the performance 
of traditional, oral-derived works, and even in textual format the reader 
plays a participatory role in determining the meaning of the words, 
phrases, or scenes.32  
 In his article “Gift and Exchange in the Indo-European Vocabulary,” 
Benveniste attempts to tease out different shades of meaning from five 
Greek words which all denote the basic meaning of ‘gift’: dôs, dosis, 
dôron, dôrea, dôtinê. He does this by examining the contexts in which the 
words appear in the Homeric epics, but does not examine the analogous 
contexts which use different nouns. Ultimately, he arrives at a 
conclusion which is merely description of the scene. 
With the exception of dôs, (a Hesiodic hapax) and dôrea (for it does 
not appear in the Iliad), I will consider the usage of the remaining three, 
 
31 See e.g. Foley 1997. These formulaic phrases, if we can project modern Slavic oral 
poetic thought onto the ancient oral poets, have been described as having morphemic 
qualities (Parry Collection 6619, cited in Foley 1997: 152). 
32 Foley 1991: 42–45. 
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as well as some additional nouns, in order to demonstrate that, except 
in one case, gift terms do not denote specific types of gifts. Following 
the discussion of nouns, we will then consider adjectives and verbs which 
appear alongside the nouns for ‘gift’. In these two sections I aim to 
illustrate that the poem uses not only nouns, but the adjective and verbs 
connected with gift giving in a way which does not support such a 
nuanced structure of gift giving: there does not seem to be linguistic 
evidence for the division of gift giving into sub-types.  
 
2.1 NOUNS 
2.1.1 Dosis 
This word appears but once in the Iliad (10.213). On the meaning of the 
noun, Benveniste comments, “in dosis the notion is presented as an 
effective accomplishment; it is the act of giving susceptible of being 
realized in a gift.”33 In other words, dosis is taken to refer to a type of gift 
giving where the gift is promised in the future upon completion of a 
requested action. This word appears in Nestor’s proposal of a nighttime 
reconnaissance mission to the Trojan camp. Nestor has just asked 
whether any of the Greeks are brave enough to carry out the mission, 
promising to whoever accepts the mission: 
 
33 Benveniste 1948: 35. 
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…καὶ ἂψ᾽ εἰς ἡμέας ἔλθοι 
ἀσκηθής· μέγα κέν οἱ ὑπουράνιον κλέος εἴη 
πάντας ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρώπους, και οἱ δόσις ἒσσεται ἐσθλή· 
Il. 10.211–213 
 
“… [if] he comes back to us 
unscathed, there would be great glory, far and wide, 
for him among all men, and he will have an excellent gift.” 
    
 It must be noted that this singular occurrence of dosis	is found in a book 
which is typically believed to be a later addition to the text.34 In addition 
to this being the only instance of the word itself in the Iliad, it is also the 
only example of the so-called ‘dative of the possessor’ grammatical 
construction being used in the context of gift giving in Homer. Could the 
isolated usage of this noun in this book merely be coincidental? Even if 
this occurrence of dosis	be ‘inauthentic’ to the original text (i.e. a later 
interpolation by an author who is not responsible for the other twenty-
three books of the Iliad),35 it should still be profitable to examine its use 
 
34 See Dué and Ebbott 2010 for recent discussion concerning Iliad 10 as well as a survey 
of past scholarship. 
35 The placement of book-divisions in the Iliad (and Odyssey) has been a matter of 
debate. For discussion concerning the division of the Iliad into books, see Heiden 
1998, 2000 for an argument in favour of the book divisions being “designed and 
textualized by the composer himself” (2000: 81).  
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here, and especially to compare it against the uses in other contemporary 
poems, viz. the Odyssey and the poems of Hesiod, in which the word 
appears with a relatively higher frequency. This examination will serve to 
illustrate that dosis is used in the hexameter tradition without the 
implication of having a nuance denoting a specific type of gift giving. 
 Benveniste notes that in the Iliad, dosis is used to denote a future 
recompense for a deed yet to be carried out.36 Although Benveniste’s 
interpretation of dosis accurately reflects the scene, I do not believe there 
is sufficient evidence for attributing such a specific semantic meaning to 
the word. Indeed, can one draw a conclusion about such a specific 
meaning of a word from only a single instance? Furthermore, each 
speaker of a language understands the same word differently, and a 
single speaker can also mean different things when using the same 
word.37 Thus, we cannot with any certainty come to a conclusion about 
what specific shade of meaning dosis	might	carry in a larger sample size. 
My hopes here are to examine the etymology of dosis and then continue 
by examining the usage of the word in other authors, in order to 
demonstrate that dosis does not carry with it a specific meaning 
suggesting the anticipated reciprocity. 
 
36 Benveniste 1948: 35. 
37 Evans 2009: 3. 
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Etymologically, the noun is formed from the verb-stem do- (‘to 
give’),38 to which is affixed the suffix -sis, which serves to substantivize 
the verb and create an action noun.39 Based on the etymology, dosis 
seems to lack an intrinsic meaning of a gift which will be provided in 
the future upon completion of services rendered.40 Thus, the noun seems 
to bear a rather generic meaning which might be expressed as ‘the act of 
giving’. 
When we compare the six occurrences of dosis in the Odyssey and in 
Hesiod against the lone use in the Iliad, we see that there is no evidence 
for such a specific meaning. For example, dosis’ use in the Odyssey (4.651) 
contradicts the overly specific meaning Benveniste has imposed upon 
the word. In this instance, we read:  
 
τὸν δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ Ἀντίνοος προσέφη Εὐπείθεος υἱος 
αὐτος ἑκών οἱ δῶκα· τί κεν ῥέξειε καὶ ἄλλος, 
ὁππότ᾽ ἀνὴρ τοιοῦτος ἔχων μελεδήματα θυμῷ 
αἰτίζῃ; χαλεπόν κεν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν εἴη. 
Od. 4.648–651 
 
And then Antinoös, son of Eupeitheos, addressed him, 
“I myself gave it willingly: what else could someone do, 
 
38 From the PIE root *deh3- ‘give’. 
39 CGCG 23.27. 
40 Benveniste 1948: 35. 
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when such a man, having anxiety in his heart, 
begs? It would be difficult to refuse giving.” 
 
We can see that the meaning of the word here is in line with its 
etymology. Rather than denoting a specific type of gift, we find that dosis 
is used only to refer to the act of giving in general. At Od. 18.287, the 
same sentiment is expressed with the noun dosis. When Penelope is 
being courted by suitors, Antinoös, a suitor, tells her that “it is not noble 
to refuse the act of giving” (“οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν ἐστίν”). 
  The other instances of dosis simply bear the basic meaning of ‘gift’, 
which seems to indicate that the semantic field of the noun has widened 
from its strictly etymological definition, i.e. from the meaning of ‘the act 
of giving’. There is no evidence, however, that the semantic field has 
narrowed with the result that it carries such a specific meaning 
conjectured by Benveniste. For instance, in Hesiod the word appears 
once in both the Theogony and the Opera et Dies. In the Theogony (93), 
Hesiod writes, in reference to the ability of a king to speak well: τοίη 
Μουσέων ἱερὴ δόσις ἀνθρώποισιν (“such is the sacred gift of the Muses 
to mankind”). In the Opera, he writes:  
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μηδέ ποτ᾽ οὐλομένην πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ 
τέτλαθ᾽ ὀνειδίζειν, μακάρων δόσιν αἰέν ἐόντων.  
Hes. Opera 717–718 
   
Do not ever allow [yourself] to reproach destructive, life-
destroying poverty in a man, [it is] always a gift from the  
blessed ones. 
 
Both of these Hesiodic examples, together with the examples from the 
Odyssey, illustrate the lack of intrinsic semantic specificity in the 
meaning of the word. Although the word may indeed diverge from its 
etymological meaning of ‘the act of giving’, and in some places bear the 
meaning ‘gift’, in none of these instances does dosis have any specific 
nuance in meaning.41 Thus, the use of the word in the Iliad, as 
Benveniste argues, is used as evidence of a semantically narrowed type 
of ‘gift’. Rather, it seems to me that the comparative evidence seems to 
favour a more general meaning, and that the use of the word in the Iliad 
has no relation to the type of reciprocity being offered.  
 In addition to examining uses of dosis outside of the Iliad, we will 
now examine passages in the Iliad which have a similar structure but 
employ different gift terms. Consideration of similar passages in the 
 
41 A widened semantic field is a completely normal linguistic process in natural 
languages. 
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Iliad itself which mirror the context of our original passage will help to 
demonstrate further that there is no inherent semantic nuance in the 
word. Later in Book 10, during the Trojan scene analogous to the one 
cited above, Hektor uses a different noun for the offering of a gift to the 
man who undertakes the reconnaissance mission:  
 
τίς κέν μοι τόδε ἔργον ὑποσχόμενος τελέσειε 
δώρῳ ἔπι μεγάλῳ; μισθὸς δε οἱ ἄρκιος ἔσται. 
Il. 10.303–304 
 
“Who would undergo and accomplish this deed 
For a great gift? The reward will be sufficient for him.” 
 
One would expect the same noun, dosis, to have been used here if it bore 
some significant meaning related to the reward of future deeds.42 
Instead, we find that the standard word for ‘gift’ (doron) is used.  
 I wish to consider a second passage which portrays an analogous 
situation of a gift being promised for the completion of an action:  
  
Ὕπνε, ἄναξ πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, 
ἠμὲν δή ποτ᾽ ἐμὸν ἔπος ἔκλυες, ἠδ᾽ ἔτι καὶ νῦν 
 
42 Throughout the poem the poet often uses the same lines verbatim (a feature of oral 
poetry), and it is interesting that here the poet would choose to use a different phrase 
if indeed dosis were an especial word for the context. 
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πείθευ· ἐγὼ δε κέ τοι ἰδέω χάριν ἤματα πάντα.  
κοίμησόν μοι Ζηνὸς ὑπ᾽ ὀφρύσιν ὄσσε φαεινώ 
αὐτίκ᾽ ἐπεί κεν ἐγὼ παραλέξομαι ἐν φιλότητι,  
δῶρα δε τοι δώσω καλὸν θρόνον, ἄφθιτον αἰεί… 
Il. 14.233–238 
 
“Sleep, lord of all the gods and all the men, 
if you ever listened to my word before, then now 
obey, and I will know gratitude forever towards you. 
put to sleep Zeus’ shining eyes under his brows for me, 
and then right away I will lay with him in love 
and I will give you gifts: a beautiful throne, eternal…” 
 
This role of the gift in this passage is also analogous to our original 
passage with	dosis: it is the promise of a future gift upon completion of 
a request. It must be noted, however, that unlike in our original passage, 
the word used here is not dosis, but dôron. Taken together with Hektor’s 
speech above, these two examples seem to show that dosis is not used in 
contexts which would favour the nuance of meaning denoting a 
promised reciprocity. Instead, we find in both analogous passages that 
the poet chooses to use the ‘standard’ noun for ‘gift’, dôron. 
 Why does dosis appear at Il. 10.213?43 One possibility is the argument 
from metrical constraint, which argues that dosis’ position in the line 
 
43        …καὶ ἂψ᾽ εἰς ἡμεBας ἔλθοι 
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disallows the use of another gift term such as dôron. Certainly, dôron	
cannot have been used in this specific position due to its differing 
metrical shape from dosis (the former is trochaic while the latter is 
iambic). One must appreciate, however, that the argument cannot 
ignore that fact that it possible to formulate a line which did not require 
the noun to occur in the penultimate foot of the line. For an example of 
this, we need not look further than Hektor’s Trojan exhort (Il. 10.303-
304) for an example of the poet composing such a line. 
 Furthermore, the choice of a unique noun at Il. 10.213 certainly seems 
to imply some sort of marked use by the poet. Indeed, the scene (and 
the entire Doloneia) is a unique occurrence in the Iliad, modelled on the 
Indo-European night-raid motif.44 The word, however, does not appear 
in the pseudo-Euripidean Rhesus, which shares the same story-motif as 
Book 10. If dosis were somehow traditionally linked to the story pattern, 
we might have expected the author of Rhesus to use it in his work. 
Furthermore, we might expect other authors who use dosis to employ it 
in situations which recall or allude to the Homeric example, which they 
do not. Hesiod’s uses of the word, for instance, although slightly marked 
 
 ἀσκηθηB ς· μεBγα κεBν οἱ ὑπουραB νιον κλεBος εἴη 
 παB ντας ἐπ᾽ ἀνθρωB πους, και οἱ δοBσις ἒσσεται ἐσθληB · 
44 See Garbutt 2006; Fries 2016. See also Bakker 2013: 157–169 for his discussion on 
his scale of interformularity and how infrequent formulae are in a sense more 
meaningful.  
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in their appearances in gnomic phrases, seem not to allude to the 
Homeric passage, or to a night-raid story type.  
 We might benefit from approaching the question from the other side: 
namely, instead of asking what the word does signify, we might ask what 
the word does not signify. Following the theories of the Formalists and 
John Miles Foley, we can argue that the use of dosis would, instead of 
drawing the audience away from the song and to a network of traditional 
motifs, would have drawn them into the song and highlight the unique 
word and motif being presented.45 In effect, the use of a word which is 
so rare in the corpus would have been defamiliarizing for the audience.46 
  
2.1.2 Dôtinê 
The second word to which we will turn our attention is dôtinê, which 
appears twice in the Iliad. It appears first in a speech by Agamemnon, 
in which he lists off all the compensation (apoina, Il. 9.120) he will give 
to Achilles in order to persuade the withdrawn fighter to re-enter the 
fight. The second use is in Odysseus’ relay of this same message to 
Achilles.47 Because dôtinê, like dosis, only appears in one unique instance 
 
45 On traditional referentiality see Foley 1997; Foley 1991. On Formalism see Schmitz 
2007: ch.1; Erlich 1980. 
46 Shklovsky 2004. 
47 The importance of Agamemnon’s use here of apoina is discussed in Wilson 2002: 
75–83. 
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in the text, and must approach the problem with the same wariness as 
before.  
 In his speech to the assembled leaders of the Greek army, 
Agamemnon famously recounts the numerous compensations he wishes 
to give to Achilles in order to placate the discord sown between the two 
in the first book of the epic.48 In this speech, in addition to a great 
number of other gifts, Agamemnon promises to give Achilles seven 
citadels which: 
   
πᾶσαι δ᾽ ἐγγὺς ἁλός, νέαται Πύλου ἠμαθόεντος· 
ἐν δ᾽ ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηνες πολυβοῦται, 
οἵ κέ ἑ δωτίνῃσι θεὸν ὥς τιμήσουσι… 
Il. 9.153–155; 295–297 
 
“are all near the salt-sea, all bordering sandy Pylos 
in which men, rich in sheep and rich in cattle, live, 
and they will honour him as a god with gifts …” 
 
These same lines are then repeated by Odysseus verbatim when he 
delivers the offer to Achilles. Benveniste writes that “the	 dôtinê, in 
Homer, is the obligatory gift offered to a chief whom one wishes to 
 
48 The speech by Agamemnon will provide ample examples of gifts which will be 
featured throughout this study below.  
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honor … or the gift that is due to one as a guest.”49 Again, as with dosis, 
can one really claim that a word which has only a single appearance 
throughout the target text has a nuance of meaning so specific? A further 
problem for committing to this semantic nuance is that there occur no 
other instances in the Iliad of analogous type of giving, we have no other 
instance of subjects offering gifts to their lord. The giving featured 
elsewhere is among the élite or gods. That Agamemnon seems to imply 
that a dôtinê is a gift most appropriate for the gods is also problematic: 
for nowhere is someone said to give to a god dôtinê. We might read in 
Agamemnon’s offer a sense of deception: he is making false promises to 
Achilles in order to convince him to accept the gifts (dôr᾽, Il 9.121) he 
offers:50 he tries to elevate Achilles to the status of a god, even though 
accepting the offer will subordinate Achilles to Agamemnon.51 In this 
reading, the offer is deceptive, but the use of dôtinê does not support the 
idea that it is a gift given to a chief by his subjects.  
 Before considering the use of dôtinê in the Iliad, let us first consider 
the uses in the Odyssey. Dôtinê appears twice in the Odyssey in separate 
 
49 Benveniste 1997: 36. The latter definition is only relevant to the Odyssey.  
50 Note that in the next line (Il. 9.121), Agamemnon calls the compensation apoina, 
blurring the lines between a gift and a ransom. 
51 On the subordination of Achilles by his offer, see Wilson 2002: ch.4. 
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contexts. First, it appears when Odysseus recounts to the Phaeacians his 
misadventures with Polyphemus: 
    
ἡμεῖς δ᾽ αὖτε κιχανόμενοι τὰ σὰ γοῦνα 
ἱκόμεθ᾽, εἴ τι πόροις ξεινήϊον ἠὲ καὶ ἄλλως 
δοίης δωτίνην, ἥ τε ξείνων θέμις ἐστιν. 
Od. 9.266–268 
 
“We, arriving, come to your knees, 
[to see] if you might offer some host-gift or else if you  
might 
give some other gift, which is the divine duty of hosts.” 
 
Here it is especially clear that dôtinê bears no specific meaning: for the 
poet has said “some other gift,” in contrast to the explicitly mentioned 
host-gift in the line above (xeinêion). The meaning of the second 
occurrence of dôtinê in the Odyssey also lacks the specific nuance of a gift 
of honour for a chief. After Odysseus has finished recounting the story 
of his katabasis to the Phaeacians, Arete, the queen, urges them not to 
send Odysseus away hastily and without many gifts. Her husband 
Alcinoös then replies (Od. 11.336–340): 
   
ξεῖνος δὲ τλήτω μάλα περ νόστοιο χατίζων  
ἒμπης οὖν ἐπιμεῖναι ἐς αὔριον, εἰς ὅ κε πᾶσαν 
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δωτίνην τελέσω… 
Od. 11.350–352 
   
“But permit the guest, though he greatly longs for his return 
home, 
to stay until tomorrow, and the entire 
gift I will procure…” 
    
In her speech, Arete refers to Odysseus as her guest (“ξεῖνος δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ 
ἐμός ἐστιν”, “he is my guest”; Od. 11.338) without the connotation of him 
being a chief whom they are honouring with gifts. Secondly, the noun 
which Arete uses for ‘gift’ is not the dôtinê that Alcinoös uses in his 
reply, but rather “dôron” (Od. 11.339). It is clear from both Arete’s and 
Alcinoös’ speeches that Odysseus is not considered to be a chief. Indeed, 
he is a shipwrecked man who is being offered hospitality for a brief 
period among them.  
 If we extend our scope chronologically and consider dôtinê in 
Herodotus, we do not find support for considering dôtinê as a gift 
specifically for a chief. Herodotus (1.69.4) tells us that when the Spartans 
asked to buy gold from the Lydians in order to make a statue, Croesus 
gave them the gold as a gift (Κροῖσος δὲ σφι ὠνεομέοισι ἔδωκε δωτίνην). 
Later, Herodotus (6.62.1) relates the story of Ariston, the childless king 
of Sparta, who contrived a deal in which his friend would give him one 
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thing of his possessions. Herodotus uses the noun dôtinê in this case to 
mean the thing Ariston will receive from his companion (hetairos). The 
use of hetairos makes it clear that the two are on relatively equal terms, 
versus if he had subordinated him through the use of a familial term 
such as son, which is what we would expect in a chief-subject 
relationship. These two Herodotean passages, therefore, do not support 
the idea that a dôtinê is a gift specifically for a chief.  
 I think we are left with no recourse but to argue that the noun, if it 
has any specific nuance, would lean only towards the gift given to a guest 
by a host. Ultimately, I think that without any analogous comparisons 
to the idea of it meaning a gift given by subjects to a chief, we cannot in 
good faith ascribe that meaning to the noun: instead one must take it, 
strictly semantically, as an alternative to the noun dôron.  
Thus, these instances of dôtinê (Il. 9.155, 297) ought to be taken as 
marked in some way. We might explain the similarities between a gift 
given to a chief and a gift given to a guest by appealing to the status of 
a guest in the household of the host. Indeed, throughout the Iliad and 
Odyssey we are shown scenes of guests being attended well (e.g. Il. 
9.197ff). Furthermore, in light of Agamemnon’s implication that a dôtinê 
is fit for a god, we might wish to postulate that he could mean this in a 
roundabout way, since Zeus is the god of guest-host interactions and 
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failing to uphold the proper etiquette is at risk of incurring Zeus’ wrath. 
Thus, giving the guest his due gift would in a way be giving to Zeus as 
well (e.g. Od. 9.268). 
 With this conclusion, we are left with the question of why the poet 
chose to use dôtinê for this specific gift Agamemnon is planning to give 
to Achilles, especially since any other word meaning gift would not have 
been out of place. One possibility, following Donna Wilson’s work on 
apoina and poinē and their differences, is to examine the use of dôtinê as 
a tactic employed by Agamemnon.52 As we will see below, dôron is a 
noun without any sort of intrinsic semantic nuance, and the entire 
episode in Book 9 deals with ‘symbolic violence’, whereby Agamemnon, 
in order to maintain his position in the social hierarchy and bring the 
war to an end, must appease Achilles’ anger and convince him to rejoin 
the battle.53 Agamemnon attempts to accomplish this by choosing 
words which both assert his dominance over Achilles, as well as by 
offering gifts which also act to establish his authority over Achilles, e.g. 
offering Achilles the hand of one of his daughters, which would 
effectively subordinate Achilles by the added familial relation. We can 
take Wilson’s theory about Agamemnon’s offer to Achilles and apply it 
 
52 Wilson 2002: 71–108; Wilson 1999.  
53 Wilson 1999: 143–144; Bourdieu 1990: 127. 
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fruitfully to the occurrence of the noun dôtinê: the occurrence of the 
noun indicates, I think, a further attempt by Agamemnon to elevate his 
own status. Indeed, where Agamemnon relates that the subjects of 
Achilles will bring him gifts and honour him as a god, Agamemnon 
especially avoids any further debasement of his own rank, as he will not 
offer Achilles any further gifts or honour him, instead others will bring 
Achilles gifts. Agamemnon thus avoids himself honouring Achilles as a 
god. 
 Although the use of dôtinê in Homer and Herodotus ultimately does 
not support it meaning a type of gift given by subjects to their chief, 
there is a broader unifying theme in its uses. In all of the cases cited 
above, the gifts in question are of exceptional value, far beyond the 
simple sword or cup that seems typical. Thus, if dôtinê were to bear a 
meaning which denoted a specific type of gift, it might be seen as 
signifying a gift of high value.54 
 
2.1.3 Dôron 
The commonest noun in the Iliad used for ‘gift’ is dôron (pl. dôra), with 
sixty-eight total occurrences in the poem. Thus, it will provide us with 
the most data to analyse and will be an important word when we come 
 
54 Valeria Logacheva, personal communication: 1 April, 2020. 
 
 
33 
to the discussion of both the practice and theory of gift giving in the 
Iliad. Unlike dosis and dôtinê, since there is more than a single occurrence 
of the word in the poem, our discussion will not be so focused on a strict 
meaning of the noun. Based on the wide variety in uses, dôron is used to 
mean ‘gift’ without any specialised connotation.55 In direct conflict with 
Benveniste’s claim that we see the emergence of specialised vocabulary 
already by Homer for different types of gift, we will see that the poem’s 
use of the noun dôron, in a wide variety of contexts, suggests that the 
poem is far from having such nuanced views. In fact, dôron is used across 
of number of situations which can be analysed as non-gifts from the 
point of view of gift theorists.  
 Modern linguists generally agree that dôron comes from the PIE root 
*deh3-ro-, ‘gift’, a root it shares with the verb didômi, ‘I give’.56 In the vast 
majority of instances in the Iliad where a gift is given, received, or 
exchanged, there occurs a reflex of this PIE root, whether that be a noun, 
 
55 LSJ9 s.v. dôron 
56 See Beekes 2009 s.v. dôron; Mallory and Addams (2009:273) give the PIE word as 
*deh3r/n-. See 2.3.1 of this thesis for treatment of the verb didômi. Compare also with 
other Indo-European languages and their own relation between ‘to give’ and ‘gift’: 
Eng. give/gift; Fr. donner/don, Russ. darit’/dar; Germ. geben/Gabe. It seems that in 
many languages the idea of a gift arises out of the verbal form meaning to give, 
seemingly without any implication about the type of giving being done (i.e. giving for 
free, i.e. alms, giving with expected repayment, giving aneconomically with expected 
reciprocation). Compare with the modern definition of a gift as something given both 
voluntarily and for free (OED s.v. gift; CED s.v. gift, which simply directs you to 
‘present’, which is described as something freely given and without economic 
consideration).  
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verb, or both. There are, however, a few marked exceptions where this 
is not the case. Due to the ubiquity of the noun dôron in the Iliad (as 
well as in other texts), we cannot here quote and examine each instance 
of its use. In lieu of this, we will take a broad look at the different uses 
the poet makes of the noun. The noun dôron means not just what in 
English we would call ‘gift, present’, but is generally used to signify 
anything that is given. During the first council in the Iliad, when 
Agamemnon is threatening to take Briseis from Achilles, Athene comes 
and promises Achilles three times as many gifts (dôra) as have been 
taken away from him (Il. 1.213). Here dôron is used to mean roughly a 
prize awarded in battle, typically called a geras in Greek. The equivalence 
is clear since the original thing taken from Achilles was his geras, Briseis. 
Other occurrences throughout the poem range from what we may 
consider to be aligned with our general modern conception of a ‘present’ 
(at least in Western culture), to meaning a ransom (e.g. Il. 22.341). These 
may be corporeal (e.g. Il. 6.293; 8.203; 19.3) or incorporeal (e.g. Il. 3.54, 
64, 65. All three of which refer to  ‘the gifts of Aphrodite’). The latter 
reflecting what we might consider to be blessings from the divine.  
  Ultimately, due to its wide semantic field, it is evident that dôron is 
the least specific gift term available to the poet, and in some cases even 
strays from what we might normally consider to be a gift. It bears no 
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inherent semantic nuance, and instead appears only to signify a gift or 
thing given. This wide semantic field will prove useful in the following 
section when we examine what exactly a gift is within the scope of the 
Iliad. 
 
2.1.4 Xeinêion 
Xeinêion occurs four times throughout the Iliad. Unlike the words which 
we have discussed above, xeinêion (pl. xeinêia) is perhaps the word most 
worthy of being treated as bearing a specific semantic nuance. Indeed, 
etymologically the word shares its root with the Greek word xeinos 
‘guest, host’ (xenos in Attic).57  
 The first use of the noun in the Iliad is during Diomedes’ speech to 
Glaukos, in which he recounts that their ancestors were guest-friends 
who exchanged gifts:  
 
Οἰνεὺς γάρ ποτε δῖος ἀμύμονα Βελλεροφόντην  
ξείνις᾽ ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐείκοσιν ἤματ ἐρύξας· 
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι πόρον ξεινήϊα καλά.  
Il. 6.216–218 
 
“For godlike Oineus received blameless Bellerophon 
 
57 xeinêion is a derivative of xe(i)nos ‘host, guest’ by means of the suffix -ion which forms 
a neuter noun from a nominal root with the resultant noun generally bearing a meaning 
which “denotes an object or action related to” the nominal root (CGCG 23.18).  
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as a guest in his halls, keeping him for twenty days. 
And they gave to one another beautiful guest-gifts.” 
 
Here, and elsewhere in the Iliad, xeinêion is used specifically to signify 
customary gifts exchanged between host and guest (10.268, 11.20, 
18.408). Due to the freedom of xenos to mean either ‘guest’ or ‘host’, the 
derivative xeinêion is able to fulfil the role of a gift given or received by 
either party in the guest-host exchange. The above example illustrates 
this by using the same noun to signify the gifts given by each party, 
instead of only referring to the gift given by one of the parties.  
This ambiguity can cause problems with the understanding of who is 
who in an exchange, which is important for the theoretical 
considerations which will follow. For instance, concerning an intricately 
crafted leather-and-tusk helmet, the narrator tells us that: 
 
Ἀμφιδάμας δὲ Μόλῳ δῶκε ξεινήϊον εἶναι, 
αὐτὰρ ὁ Μηριόνῃ δῶκεν ᾧ παιδὶ φορῆναι· 
δὴ τότ᾽ Ὀδυσσῆος πύκασεν κάρη ἀμφιτεθεῖσα. 
              Il. 10.269–271 
 
Amphidamas gave it to Molos to be a guest-gift, 
but he gave it to his son, Meriones to wear. 
And now, having been put on, it covers closely the head of 
 Odysseus. 
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This passage makes clear that the helmet Odysseus is wearing was once 
given as a guest-gift. We are not told, however, whether Amphidamas 
is the guest or the host. Although this might seem trivial, knowing the 
social standing of the one who gives the gift can allow one to speculate 
on the acceptability of certain gifts in various social scenarios. For 
instance, just as we have conventions about what is considered an 
acceptable (or even expected) gift in certain social situations (e.g. the 
convention for a guest to bring wine to the host of an evening party), 
could there be a distinguishable convention like this among the elite in 
Homeric poetry? Lastly, it is worth briefly noting that a xeinêion need 
not be given right away.  
There is also no clear answer as to when it is appropriate to give 
xeinêia. Although in the first example between Bellerophon and Oineus 
the gifts are exchanged conterminously, in a later occurrence (Il. 18.407–
409) we are presented with a scene in which Hephaistos is repaying 
Thetis with xeinêia for her hospitality when she raised him after he was 
thrown from Olympus.58 This seeming ambivalence towards when one  
must give the xeineion suggests that there is a rather loose underlying 
structure in the practice of giving guest-gifts.  
 
58 See Slatkin 1991 for an account of Thetis and her importance to the plot of the Iliad. 
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Ultimately, both etymologically and in practice, it seems clear that 
xeinêion is a noun specific to the situation of a gift being given between 
a guest and host, without distinction of it being either a guest’s gift to 
his host, or a host’s gift to his guest.  
  
2.2 ADJECTIVES 
2.2.1 Kakos 
Having discussed the nouns which the poet of the Iliad uses to signify 
‘gift’, we will now turn to the adjectives which he employs to qualify 
them. Notably, except in one case (Il. 24.528), the adjectives used with 
gift terms are never negative in terms of value judgement.59 In light of 
there being only a single negative description of a gift, we will first 
consider the unique occurrence before analysing the usual positive 
descriptions. The sole instance of a negative description of a gift terms 
occurs in the final book of the Iliad. In this scene, Priam has covertly 
entered into the Greek camp in order to ransom the body of Hektor 
from Achilles. In his reply to Priam’s supplication, Achilles begins his 
 
59 One might be tempted to argue that the lack of positive qualifying adjective is itself 
a negative comment on the gift, however I believe that unless there is an overt negative, 
it is impossible to know whether the speaker or narrator believes the gift to be 
somehow inappropriate.  
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reply with a parable about the nature of suffering in which he claims 
that: 
  
δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διός οὔδει  
δώρων οἷα δίδωσι κακῶν, ἕτερος δὲ ἑάων. 
              Il. 24.527–528 
 
There are two pithoi laying on Zeus’ floor 
of gifts he gives, the one of evils, the other of good things.” 
 
Two things in this passage are important for our study. First is that the 
word dôron is used here with the implication that human fate is in some 
way a gift, and second, that this gift can sometimes be evil (i.e. woes, 
misfortune) itself.60 This usage of dôron serves to illustrate the broad 
meaning of the word in the poem. It is important to note that in this 
context Achilles is not claiming that the gift Zeus gives is somehow 
inappropriate or against the established code of gift giving. Within the 
Iliad, then, we have no instance in the poem of a gift being given which 
is judged to be inappropriate to the occasion. What this passage does 
 
60 We can perhaps see in Achilles’ statement the acknowledgement that everything is 
ultimately a gift from the gods, whether it be ‘good’ or bad’, the gods are responsible 
for everything including the very existence of humanity (see Godelier 1999: 29–31). 
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tell us, however, is that not all gifts are desirable, but the point of the 
story is that one must accept whatever fate (gift) the gods mete out.61   
 
2.2.2 AGLAOS 
One of the many positive adjectives which often modifies dôron in the 
Iliad is aglaos, “an epithet of commendations of somewhat indefinite 
meaning,” which can mean approximately ‘splendid’, ‘bright’.62 When 
modifying dôron, the adjective only appears in the final two feet of the 
line. Aglaos is not only used to describe gifts. The poet uses it a number 
of times in other contexts to describe things such as ransom (apoina, e.g. 
Il. 1.23; 1.111), persons (e.g. Il. 2.736; 5.283; 10.196; 18.337), or even water 
(Il. 2.307). The commonest noun modified by aglaos is huios ‘son’.  
 From its use alongside such diverse nouns, aglaos cannot be said to 
have a strong semantic nuance within the Iliad. When the adjective is 
used to refer to a gift, about half of the time it is used to describe 
unknown gifts (i.e. when we are not told what the gift is), and in the 
rest of its occurrences it refers to different types of gifts that share only 
a few similarities. The clearest similarity in use comes from the 
description of a number of gifts given to Peleus and his son Achilles by 
 
61 MacLeod 1982: ad loc. MacLeod contrasts Achilles’ belief that evils can be from the 
gods with Plato’s rejection that is this not possible (Rep. 379d). 
62 Cunliffe s.v. aglaos. 
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the gods. Peleus’ horses (Il. 16.381) and armour (which is lost to Hektor 
by Patroklos; Il. 18.83) as well as Achilles’ new panoply (Il. 18.64;19.18) 
are both described as aglaos. Apart from the shared divine origin of the 
gifts, though, there seems not to be any unifying factor in the usage of 
aglaos.63 Similarly, during Achilles’ speech on human fate, he describes 
the gifts given Peleus by the gods (both good and evil) as aglaos (24.534). 
Ultimately, the poet seems to use aglaos in context of god-given gifts 
most often when the gifts are named. There are, however, instances 
where a named gift is described as aglaos but not from a god: Alexander’s 
gift of gold to bribe a Trojan to vote against giving Helen back (Il. 11.124) 
and the mules Priam had received from the Mysians (Il. 24.278). These 
occurrences suggest that aglaos is not used in specific contexts of gift 
giving but is instead a generally applicable positive adjective applied to 
a number of different things.  
 
2.2.3 Axios  
The adjective axios, meaning ‘sufficient’, ‘suitable’, ‘worthy’, has the 
implication of offering a value judgement on the gift it describes. By 
looking at the gifts so described, we might be able to learn what the poet 
or characters consider to be a suitable gift in certain circumstances. 
 
63 Although, as we saw above (n.55), all things can be conceived as a gift from the gods. 
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Problematically, however, the poem provides us with merely two 
instances of axios as a descriptor of a gift.     
During the Embassy episode, Odysseus uses the adjective axios to 
describe the gifts Agamemnon is offering in order to persuade Achilles 
to lay aside his anger.64 The social context of this use of axios, however, 
affects the way we interpret the meaning. This scene is filled with 
instances of careful word-choice when the characters speak of the gifts 
Agamemnon will offer. Odysseus, as Donna Wilson points out, knows 
that what Agamemnon has said is not what Achilles wants to hear. Just 
as he leaves a few lines out during his otherwise verbatim delivery of 
Agamemnon’s offer, Odysseus chooses to describe the gifts as axia in an 
attempt to help persuade Achilles that what he is being offered is fair, 
even if Agamemnon is offering the wrong type of compensation.65
 Although this scene does not present a typical instance of gift giving, 
due to the incredible number of gifts being offered, the use of axios 
makes it clear that the gifts being offered are thought of as suitable at 
least by Odysseus.  
 
64 This fits well with Mauss’ belief that the gift is never disinterested. Some theoretical 
frameworks for gifts (e.g. Derrida 1992: 1–33), however, argue that a gift must be 
exactly the opposite: always disinterested, or else it is no longer a gift, but merely 
something within the economy of a society. This is a matter of anachronism: for as 
Mauss mentions, this notion of freely given gifts is modern (Mauss 2016). 
65 Wilson 1999: 135ff. 
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 The second usage of axios demonstrates that this adjective is also used 
to mean ‘suitable’ in a more typical social situation. During the funeral 
games of Patroklos, Achilles proposes to give Meriones second prize, 
even though he finished last (Il. 23.536–538). This proposal, although met 
with unanimous approval from the spectators (Il. 23.539 “οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα 
πάντες ἐπῄνεον ὡς ἐκέλυε”),66 is challenged by Antilochos, who placed 
second in the race (Il. 23.543–554). To Antilochos’ complaint, Achilles 
replies: 
    
Ἀντίλοχ᾽, εἰ μὲν δή με κελεύεις οἴκοθεν ἄλλο 
Εὐμήλῳ ἐπιδοῦναι, ἐγὼ δέ κε καὶ τὸ τελέσσω. 
δώσω οἱ θώρῃκα, τὸν Ἀσττεροπαῖον ἀπηύρων, 
χάλκεον, ᾧ πέρι χεῦμα φαεινοῦ κασσιτέροιο 
ἀμφιδεδείνηται· πολέος δέ οἱ ἄξιος ἔσται. 
              Il. 23.558–562 
 
“Antilochos, if you bid me to give something else 
from my house to Eumelos, I will do it. 
I will give him the bronze breastplate, taken from  
Asteropaios, around which a plating of shining tin 
runs. It will be of great worth for him.” 
 
 
66 It is interesting to note that Achilles nearly commits the same folly as Agamemnon 
in Book 1 which gave way to Achilles’ anger: Achilles intends here to strip the rightful 
recipient of their due prize. 
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This passage provides us with a much more typical gift giving scenario: 
a single gift is given to a dear friend for his efforts during a race. 
Although the two uses of axios to modify a gift occur in different 
circumstances, there is still a strong unifying link between both uses. In 
both instances, the person describing the gift is one who is trying to 
assuage a slight to another’s honour. Odysseus describes Agamemnon’s 
offered gifts as axia perhaps not because he truly believes them to be 
suitable, but in an attempt to persuade Achilles to accept them. 
Similarly, when Achilles decides to give Meriones a bronze breastplate, 
he too is trying to assuage the recipient’s slighted honour.67 Thus, when 
a gift is described as axios, it is perhaps not necessarily a commentary on 
the gift itself, but a persuasive technique. Indeed, as the only two uses 
of axios to describe a gift occur in ring composition, the poetic qualities 
of the adjective should be stressed more than the theoretical implications 
it may have on gift giving as a practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
67 On the pre-determined pacing of the participants in the Funeral Games episode, see 
Stocking (forthcoming). 
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2.3 VERBS 
2.3.1 DIDÔMI 
Didômi is the commonest verb employed for the giving of gifts in the 
Iliad. As mentioned above, in the overwhelming majority of instances 
where a character in the Iliad gives a gift, the text uses at least one reflex 
of PIE *deh3-ro-, and often both the verb and the noun will be from that 
same root. Of course, didômi is used in a number of different situations, 
not just in the giving of what we might consider a gift. For example, 
Diomedes gives his horse to a lackey to take back to camp (Il. 5.26). 
When used with gifts, didômi is used with gifts that are not only 
corporeal, one might give something incorporeal: Zeus gives pains to 
Agamemnon (Il. 2.375 alge’ edoken), the gods give to Hektor the art of 
warcraft and to other men, different skills (Il. 13.727–734).  
 In addition to lacking any specificity in regard to what one may give, 
didômi is also unspecific in regard to who can give and to whom. There 
are numerous instances of men giving to men (e.g. Il. 7.299), men giving 
to gods (e.g. 20.299), gods giving to men (e.g. 16.381), and gods giving 
to gods (e.g. Il. 14.238). Like dôron	above, didômi	furnishes a number of 
examples for us to examine theoretically and practically in our 
formulation of a system of giving in the Iliad.  
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2.3.2 DEKHOMAI 
It is also important to examine the instance of the use of dekhomai ‘to 
receive,’ ‘accept’. As Mauss writes in his Essai sur le don, “Refuser de 
donner, négliger d’inviter, comme refuser de prendre, équivaut à declarer 
la guerre ; c’est refuser l’alliance et la communion.”68 Indeed, where 
characters do accept gifts (or something given them), it is described as 
something done “rejoicing” (e.g. Il. 23.647 “τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐγὼ πρόφρων 
δέχομαι, χαίρει δε μοι ἦτορ,” “I accept it cheerfully, and my heart 
rejoices”; Il 23.797 “ὅ δ᾽ ἐδέξατο χαίρων” “rejoicing, he accepted it”). In 
the Iliad, to refuse a gift offered is a transgression. If a gift is refused, the 
social bond between giver and would-be recipient is destroyed. Indeed, 
the Iliad begins with Agamemnon rejecting an offer from the Trojan 
priest Chryses, who is trying to ransom his daughter from Agamemnon.  
The consequences of a rejected gift are not easily reversed. In the 
Iliad, we see that after a gift has been rejected, it is likely that the gift 
will no longer be given, should the one who rejected it later change his 
mind. For instance, Agamemnon loses out on the ransom he would have 
received should he have accepted (Il. 1.98-99). Further evidence of this 
is found in the moral story Phoenix relates to Achilles in Book 9, when 
Agamemnon is offering to Achilles a plethora of gifts (Il. 9.598–599). 
 
68 Mauss 1923-4: 51. 
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Indeed, the rejection of an offering can be seen as a dishonour done unto 
the one who has offered (Il. 1.94). 
 
2.4 PHILOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS 
Although Benveniste’s method of attempting to tease out nuances in 
meaning between the numerous Greek words for ‘gift’ which appear in 
the Homeric epics is in some ways a helpful tool, I believe that the 
underlying principles of his study are problematic. Many of the nouns 
he endows with narrow meanings occur only once or twice, and do not 
permit a thorough comparative analysis. Even when we consider the 
words outside of their Homeric context in later literature, we find that 
this specificity does not obtain. If there were some emerging specificity 
developing in the Homeric language, we would have expected that this 
specificity be more pronounced in the later authors. 
The approach of assigning nouns to specific types of gift giving takes 
for granted that there is such a specific structural system of gift giving in 
operation in the Iliad, and I have shown that, both etymologically and 
contextually, there is very little support for gift terms being 
representative of a system of gift giving which differentiates types of gifts 
by vocabulary. Instead of using this structuralist approach, I believe that 
we must approach the terms from a more poetic point-of-view. For 
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instance, the Russian Formalist Viktor Slovskij’s ideas of linguistic 
automation and John Miles Foley’s theory of traditional referentiality 
are helpful here. Slovskij’s approach to poetic language argues that 
“poetical language acts against automatization,” the variant language 
used serves as a means by which the poet may attract the attention of 
the audience away from the banal language of the every-day.69 Similarly, 
John Miles Foley’s theory of traditional referentiality argues that the oral 
poet’s use of certain words and scenes can evoke in the mind of the 
audience an entire mythic association.70 Such marked uses of gift terms 
may then serve as a means by which the poet is able to draw the 
audience’s attention to the scene.  
Ultimately, the uses of the gift giving nouns do not support 
understanding them as words connected with specific structuralist types 
of gift giving. Rather, the words themselves I believe to be important 
for their being different. With the exception of the specific xeineion, the 
gift terms serve largely as synonyms of the banal dôron. 
 
 
 
 
69 Schmitz 2007: 23. Cf. Erlich 1980: 176–178.  
70 See Foley 1997. 
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2 
PRACTICE & THEORY 
 
 
 
n the previous chapter I showed that an approach which relies on 
vocabulary with the aim of  discerning an underlying system of gift 
giving is problematic—namely, the approach presupposes that the 
Greeks had a conscious distinction and that this distinction is manifest 
in the language of the poetic tradition. Although this conjecture is not 
supported by the textual evidence, the basic idea, viz. paying close 
attention to the language used in scenes involving gift giving is 
profitable. By examining the passages which include gift terms, and 
those which do not, we find that the use of these terms lacks a 
universality which can be fully explained by sociological theories of gift 
giving. 
 First, we will look at the current theoretical conceptions of gift 
giving, arguing ultimately that these ideas cannot be applied to the Iliad, 
without either modifying theory or text. Following this theoretical 
discussion, we will take examples from the Iliad in order to illustrate that 
the use (or avoidance) of gift giving language in certain scenes is 
I 
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meaningful. In these readings, we cannot unproblematically apply a 
universalising theory to the text.71 We will also see that gift terms are 
used throughout the poem to describe exchanges which are far from 
freely given or distinct from other forms of giving, which I believe 
requires that we be attendant to the language used in the scenes which 
involve (or do not involve) gift terms. That gift terms are being used in 
situations identified by narrator or character as not being freely given is 
important. Conceptions of gift giving revolve around the true or feigned 
nature of a gift being given freely.  
Gifts are things that are given freely, voluntarily. In English, this is 
axiomatic, the word ‘gift’ is defined as “a thing given willingly to 
someone without payment; a present.”72 As Mauss notes, however, this 
is a theoretical pretension which does not obtain in reality.73 Gifts are 
economic, but participants must suspend their belief that this is the case. 
Bourdieu writes that:  
gift exchange is one of the social games which cannot be played 
unless the players refuse to acknowledge the objective truth of 
the game, the very truth that objective analysis brings to light, 
and unless they are predisposed to contribute, with their efforts, 
 
71 I have in mind here Donlan (1997: 663), whom I quote below. 
72 OCED3 s.v. ‘gift’.  
73 Mauss 2016: 57. 
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their marks of care and attention, and their time, to the 
production of collective misrecognition.74 
 
Similarly, Derrida writes that “the simple identification of a gift seems 
to destroy it.”75 These three theorists all hit upon the same idea: 
participants in gift giving must be able to suspend their belief that their 
actions are in actuality economic. As we will see in the analysis of 
passages below, this need to misrecognise economic transactions is 
missing from the Homeric instances of exchange.  
As we saw in Chapter 1, attempts to divide gifts up based on language 
is generally problematic. Even the category of xeinêia is problematic in 
that there are some clear instances of gifts between people bound by 
xenia which are not called a xeineion. The exchange between Diomedes 
and Glaukos (which will be discussed at length in the following chapter) 
is an instance of this. So too are other forms of division. Indeed, when 
we try to divide gifts up by different criteria, we quickly learn that there 
are exceptions or overlap. Instead, this chapter will begin with a 
discussion of modern gift giving theory, showing how there are 
 
74 Bourdieu 1992: 105–106. 
75 Derrida 1997: 130. Derrida 1997: 138 continues, writing that “one could go so far 
as to say that a work as monumental as Marcel Mauss’s The Gift speaks of everything 
but the gift: It deals with economy, exchange, contract (do et des), it speaks of raising 
the stakes, sacrifice, gift and counter gift—in short. Everything that in the thing itself 
impels the gift and the annulment of the gift.” 
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problems in the text which do not allow for these theories to be applied 
to the Iliad. Following this, I will introduce and compare a number of 
gift giving instances from the Iliad in order to illustrate that not only do 
modern theories fail to explain entirely the instances of gift terms, but 
also that the use of gift terms throughout the Iliad appears to be 
unsystematic. In many cases, for example, something described as a gift 
in one instance will be described as a part of economic exchange in 
another analogous scene. Furthermore, characters will sometimes cease 
to consider something a gift abruptly.   
 
2.1 THEORY  
As we saw above, gift theory began with the publication of Mauss’ “Essai 
sur le don” in 1924–25.76 In his work, Mauss advanced the idea that no 
gift is disinterested, that is to say, no gift, regardless of what the 
participants believe, is given for free. For Mauss, gifts are a part of a 
system of total prestation, in which collectives exchange much more 
than simply moveable wealth. Mauss argues that “prestations and 
counterprestations are entered into somewhat more voluntarily, by way 
of presents (cadeaux), although ultimately they are strictly compulsory, 
 
76 See n.1. 
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on pain of private or public war.”77 In effect, Mauss believes that 
anything in a society can be exchanged: from ranks, to persons, to 
traditional moveable goods, and all of these things are interrelated. 
According to Marshall Sahlins and David Graeber, Mauss seems to 
believe that the gift was a form of Hobbesian social contract, one which 
served ‘pre-political’ societies, stopping them from all-out war with one 
another.78 This is challenged by Graeber, however, who says that there 
is “no explanation of why members of different ‘clans, tribes, and 
families’ should feel inclined to kill each other in the first place.”79  
Perhaps Mauss’ most famous (and most criticized) theoretical 
conjecture is that of the hau, a concept he developed from his 
interpretation of an explanation given by Tamati Ranaipiri, a Maori: 
I will now speak of the hau… The hau is not the hau that 
blows—not at all. I will carefully explain to you. Suppose that 
you possess a certain article, and you give that article to me, 
without price. We make no bargain over it. Now. I give that 
article to a third person, who, after some time has elapsed, 
decides to make some return for it (utu), and so he makes me a 
present of some article (taonga). Now, that article (taonga) that 
 
77 Mauss 2016: 61.  
78 Sahlins 2017: ch.4; Graeber 2001: 154. 
79 Graeber 2001: 154. 
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he gives to me is the hau of the article I first received from you 
and then gave to him. The goods (taonga) that I received for 
that item I must hand over to you. It would not be right for me 
to keep such goods for myself, whether they be desirable (rawe) 
items or otherwise (kino). I must hand that item over to you, 
because they are a hau of the article (taonga) you gave me. Were 
I to keep such equivalent for myself, then some serious evil 
would befall me, even death. Such is the hau, the hau of 
personal property, or the forest hau.80 
 
Mauss, in need of an explanation for why gifts must be reciprocated, 
appealed to the Maori concept of hau, which he interpreted as a sort of 
spirit of the thing given: a force with which the thing given is imbued 
and which compels a return to its original owner.81 The latter claim has 
been subjected to criticism from not long after it appeared. Claude Levi-
Strauss, for example, has criticized Mauss’ methodological approach: 
“Mauss strives to reconstruct a whole out of parts; and as that is 
manifestly not possible, he has to add to the mixture an additional 
quantity which gives him the illusion of squaring the account. This 
 
80 Mauss 2016: 70. Hereafter I will refer to this text as the ‘Ranaipiri text’. 
81 Mauss 2016: 70–73. 
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quantity is the hau.”82 Levi-Strauss here is arguing that, because Mauss 
had isolated three parts of the exchange: giving, receiving, and 
reciprocation, Mauss was in need of something to make reciprocation 
necessary, for otherwise, it would seem to be irrelevant to the account 
he had put forward. Why does one need to reciprocate? What has 
happened in Mauss’ case is that he has fallen victim to “the explanatory 
value of Polynesian beliefs.”83 Mauss has taken the reason given by the 
Polynesians as a universal explanation, rather than as merely the reason 
in which the Polynesians believe. 
Mauss’ interpretation of the hau is also called into question by 
Marshall Sahlins in his Stone Age Economy, where he shows that Mauss 
misunderstands the Ranaipiri text. Sahlins argues that “the Maori was 
trying to explain a religious concept by an economic principle, which 
Mauss promptly understood the other way around.”84 The exchange of 
goods which Ranaipiri was attempting to describe was completely 
secular: “The meaning of hau one disengages from the exchange of 
taonga is as secular as the exchange itself.”85 The idea which was being 
illustrated by the example of the Ranaipiri text, Sahlins suggests, is the 
 
82 Levi-Strauss 1997: 55.  
83 Godelier 1999: 25. 
84 Sahlins 1997: 76–77.  
85 Sahlins 1997: 79.  
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unacceptability of profiting from the gift of another. The hau is best 
understood as that very profit, which must be yielded to the original 
giver.86 This idea of hau, whether we follow Mauss’ or Sahlins’ 
interpretation of it is not found in the Iliad; we do not read of any such 
exchange which matches this Maori example. Gifts in the Iliad are given 
without the imperative from an underlying force. 
The idea that there resides in an object the ‘spirit’ of the previous 
owner(s), however, is not completely alien to the Iliad. As Lilah Grace 
Canevaro argues, a ‘spirit’ of the past possessor(s) resides in epic objects, 
creating a biography which is largely made up of past owners and the 
maker of the item.87 As she notes, however, this is predominantly related 
to male objects, which are retrospective, in contrast to female objects 
which are proleptic: “that is to say that male objects evoke stories from 
the past, giving the object potency in the present, whereas women’s 
objects—and the women themselves—are focused less on recalling the 
past in the present and more on perpetuating memory of the present in 
the future.”88 Although the objects in epic seem to, in a way, retain a 
part of their former owner, the connection with the hau is problematic. 
 
86 See Sahlins 2017: ch.4 for a full discussion. 
87 Canevaro 2018: ch.1.2 passim. 
88 Canevaro 2018: 44–45. For example, the exchange between Diomedes and Glaukos 
“is testament to the fact that the memory of a past  gift exchange can have real power  
in the present” (Canevaro 2018: 47–48). 
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To begin, this connection to previous owners is not agentic: it does not 
compel the current possessor to reciprocate, it serves more as a means of 
memorialisation. Because this feature of memorialisation is limited to 
certain gifts only, it lacks a universality needed in a structuralist account 
of gift giving.89  
 We might here also briefly consider some of Bourdieu’s thoughts on 
giving. What is most important for me here is Bourdieu’s focus on time, 
something which is present in Mauss’ work on the Maori, which was 
not used as much as it could have been.90 Bourdieu’s argument is that 
the act of giving is one which occupies time, and the analysis of the 
practice must take into account that time, for indeed time is even itself 
a part of the exchange, whereby parties may display inferiority or 
superiority by the intentional use of time in reciprocation.91 Indeed, in 
the Iliad, we see heroes immediately reciprocate gifts, or else see only a 
single instant of a gift giving process. For example, we read that Kinyras 
has given to Agamemnon a corselet on account of the Trojan War (Il. 
 
89 cf. The opening paragraph of Godelier 1999:1 on the justification for “yet another 
analysis of gift-exchange…” He writes that his analysis is justified “because gift-giving 
exists everywhere, even if it is not the same everywhere [my italics]”. If gift giving does 
not obtain in the same way for every society or culture in which it exists, can we be 
justified in applying universalising theories to the practice? 
90 In the Ranaipiri text, the issue is brought up with the line, “Now, I give that article 
to a third person, who, after some time has elapsed, decides to make some return for it…” 
(Mauss 1997: 70; emphasis my own) 
91 Bourdieu 1997: 190–198. 
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11.20). This passage illustrates the problematic nature of analysing gift 
giving in the text: we lose out on the entire temporal aspect of this 
instance. The examples of gift giving in the Iliad are all detotalized; we 
do not have access to the entire practice, but only a small part of it. As 
we have seen above, in order to fully appreciate and evaluate gift giving, 
we must have more than merely the instance of giving, for that action is 
only a small part of the entire practice.  
 
3.2 GIFTS 
Categorising gifts in the Iliad is problematic. Not only are there myriad 
ways of categorising gifts, it is not always clear what exactly a gift being 
given is. Many instances of dôron do not tell us what is being given as a 
gift (e.g. Il. 1.213, 230; 9.113; 18.408; 24.77). One possibility of categorising 
is to classify the gift as relating to the martial or domestic sphere. The 
problems we run into when trying to categorise gifts as ‘martial’ or 
‘domestic’ are that a gift itself may be related to one of these two social 
spheres but given in a different sphere (e.g. Il. 6.215–219, which narrates 
a domestic scene in which a martial item is given), or else, we might run 
into the problem of groups being too encompassing or too restrictive to 
be of any use at all. The best option for categorising gifts is to base the 
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categories on donor, where mortals and immortals have distinct gifts.92 
There is a marked distinction between what mortals give and what 
immortals give: the gods are able to give divine items such as immortal 
horses (Il. 16.381, 867). This section will read some scenes of gift giving 
from the Iliad which are clearly marked by the use of a gift term, but 
which pose problems for a straightforward interpretation of gift giving 
in the epic.  
 There are a small number of martial gifts which are given throughout 
the Iliad, which are either weapons or armour. Gifts of weapons consist 
of swords (Il. 7.307; 10.255; 23.807), spears (Il. 23.896–897), and a bow 
given by Apollo (Il. 2.827). Gifts of armour consist of war-belts (Il. 6.219; 
7.305), helmets (Il. 10.268–270), corselets (Il. 11.20, 23; 15.532; 23.560), and 
a shield (Il. 10.255), and full panoplies (Il. 18.82, 85; 19.366). Not all of 
these are explicitly called a gift. Indeed, when we consider which of these 
are clearly marked as gifts, our list shrinks substantially: only two belts 
(Il. 6.219, 7.305), one sword (Il. 7.305), one helmet (Il. 10.268), one 
 
92 Sissa 2000:18, on the division between mortals and gods, writes, “The great cultural 
divide that cuts the world of the Iliad in two is not the separation between the Greeks 
and the Trojans, for the resemblance between the men on the two opposed sides is 
almost total… Compared to them, it is the Immortals who appear as a completely 
different nation. They have a language of their own, their own kind of food, and they 
use metals in their own idiosyncratic way.”  
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corselet (Il. 11.20), and two sets of full armour (18.83, 19.367) are described 
as gifts.93  
What is remarkable about these gifts is that not all are brought about 
by the same catalyst: and indeed, when we compare other gifts given 
which are brought about by the same catalyst (e.g. guest-host 
interaction, athletic prizes), we find that different types of gifts are given 
sometimes in the same interaction. For instance, the two occurrences of 
a war-belt (zôstêr) being given are markedly different. On the one hand, 
we have the episode between Oineus and Bellerophon, narrated by 
Diomedes:  
    
οἱ δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι πόρον ξεινήϊα καλά· 
Οἰνεὺς μὲν ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν… 
              Il. 6.218–219 
 
And they gave each other beautiful guest-gifts: 
Oineus gave a shining-red war-belt… 
 
Notably, this gift was brought about because Oineus hosted 
Bellerophon for twenty days. These specific gifts are seemingly irrelevant 
 
93 When Achilles fights in the armour Hephaistos makes him, individual pieces of the 
full panoply are said to be a gift of the god (e.g. Il. 20.265, 268; 21.165, 594). Because 
these are part of the set given, I choose not to count each piece as an individual gift.  
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to the narrative of the poem.94 In another instance we have a zôstêr being 
exchanged at the end of combat: Hektor gives to Aias a silver-studded 
sword, and Aias gives to Hektor a shining-red war-belt (Il. 7.303–305). 
The catalyst for this exchange was the setting of the sun, causing them 
to put off their heart-consuming strife (eridos thumoboroio, Il. 7.301). The 
narrative of the poem, perhaps, complicates this gift. For the belt given 
by Aias, in spirit of their new friendship and end of hatred, is perhaps 
then used by Achilles to tie Hektor’s corpse to his chariot in his attempt 
to defile the body (Il 22.396–400).95 The belt, once a symbol of 
 
94 It is remarked (Gaisser 1969: 175) that from a narrative perspective these gifts allow 
for ring composition culminating in the exchange between Diomedes and Glaukos. 
This will be discussed below when the episode between Diomedes and Glaukos is given 
a thorough analysis.  
95 The idea of the belt itself being used is recorded in Sophocles’ Ajax 1029–1031. de 
Jong (2012: ad loc.) and Finglass (2012: 431) comment that Homer may have supressed 
the version in which Hektor was dragged while alive. Cf. Soph. Ajax 1030–1031.  
 This reading of the defilement of the corpse is problematic. The passage in Soph. 
Ajax (1028–1039) from which the idea seems to originate is considered an 
interpolation by some (e.g. Finglass 2011: ad loc). He writes that the use of the belt to 
tie Hektor to the chariot “is not attested for a millennium (Leontius Scholasticus A.P. 
7.151, 7.152), and is probably an innovation for this passage (thus West (1978) 117): 
such a detail is only relevant within the confines of this rhetorical juxtaposition.” 
Furthermore, the scholia on the Iliad do not seem to mention that the leather with 
which Hektor was tied was the belt given him by Aias. West (1978:117) seems to 
believe that the passage is legitimate but is not strongly attached to the idea that the 
use of the belt is original: “the identification of this ligature with the belt which Ajax 
once gave Hektor in exchange for a sword (Il. 7.303ff.) may be an innovation [emphasis 
mine].” Jebb (1896: 235) suggests that the idea was an allusion to an earlier poem, 
“possibly in the Aitheopis or the Little Iliad. In any case, it is evident that the account 
of Hektor’s death adopted by Sophocles cannot be regarded as his own invention ; his 
manner of referring to it clearly implies another source.” If we are to follow Jebb, we 
can assume that this tradition of the use of the belt given by Aias was in circulation at 
an early date. 
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friendship, is made to illustrate the opposite feeling: Achilles’ hatred of 
Hektor. In the same vein, the suicide of Ajax using the sword of Hektor 
is more established in the tradition: Alex Purves writes that “there is a 
suggestion in the Iliad that each of his appearances is backlit by our 
awareness of his approaching suicide.”96 West, following Jebb, suggests 
that’s the tradition of Aias’ suicide by Hektor’s gift was present in the 
Epic Cycle.97 
We may also take a moment here to bring to light the difference 
between this gift and the one between Oineus and Bellerophon: while 
the latter still exerts pressure on Diomedes and Glaukos not to fight, the 
gifts given between Aias and Hektor do not incur a long-lasting bond 
between the two: we find them once again in combat with one another 
later in the poem (e.g. Il. 13.188–194; 14.402–408; 18.155–158). It seems, 
 
 If Homer did indeed suppress the scene of Hektor being dragged alive as too 
grotesque for the poem, it raises an interesting problem related to speech acts, for 
Homer certainly includes speeches which suggest especially heinous treatment of 
bodies. I am thinking specifically of Achilles’ threat to eat Hektor’s flesh raw (Il. 
22.346–347). The lines draw out the difference between a speech act and an act itself: 
it would seem that the speech act is seen as a lesser offence than committing the act 
itself, that the desire to descend from humanity is acceptable (as poetic material, not 
as popular morality).  
 On the topic of abusing bodies, see, e.g. Vernant 1991. 
96 Purves 2015: 83.  
97 West 1978: 117; Jebb 1896: 235 
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then, that the gift is not a reliable method of creating a lasting social 
bond between two persons.98  
One final example will serve to illustrate the diversity of situations in 
which characters in the Iliad give gifts of a military nature: Achilles’ 
armour, which Patroklos will wear on his doomed attempt to boost 
Greek morale, was originally given as a wedding present: 
… τεύχεα δ᾽ Ἕκτωρ 
δῃώσας ἀπέδυσε πελώρια, θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι, 
καλά· τὰ μὲν Πηλῆϊ θεοὶ ἀφλαὰ δῶρα 
ἤματι τῷ ὅτε σε βροτοῦ ἀνέρος ἔμβαλον εὐνῇ. 
Il. 18.82–85 
 
And Hektor, having killed 
him, stripped the mighty armour, a wonder to look at, 
and beautiful: which the gods gave to Peleus as a splendid gift 
on that day when they threw you to the marriage  
bed of a mortal man. 
 
 These instances illustrate that martial gifts are not confined only to 
the context of war. Certainly, gifts given in times of war are martial, but 
there is not much option otherwise, unless perhaps one of the 
 
98 See Mueller 2015: 24–25 on Hektor’s linguistic manipulation of the exchange and 
the gifts’ place not in a lasting friendship but as “a placeholder[s] for future conflict”   
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participants in the gift giving happened to be carrying with him a cup 
or other non-martial item.  
 Focusing now on domestic gifts, we notice first of all a distinctly 
smaller number of gifts given are of a domestic nature. The first instance 
belongs to the exchange between Oineus and Bellerophon. In return for 
the war-belt given him, Bellerophon gives to Oineus a golden double-
cup (Il. 6.220). As another example we have a bowl given by the 
Phoenicians to Thoas (Il. 23.745). As a final example we might add the 
robe Hekabê took as a gift to Athene (Il. 6.293). This imbalance of gifts 
can be understood in a number of ways. First, we might explain it by 
appealing to the nature of the poem: the Iliad largely deals with war, and 
as such the social interactions which result in a domestic gift being given 
are, by necessity, underrepresented in the poem.  
 About these corporeal gifts, Donlan writes, 
 
 “Gift giving among the Homeric elite…has maximum social 
and political purpose, but little economic purpose… All offers, 
acceptances, or exchanges of dôra are instrumental, either in 
establishing, maintaining, or repairing a relationship, or in 
minimising hostility, or validating or calibrating (and even 
creating) differences in rank.”99 
 
99 Donlan 1997: 663.  
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This assertion is essentially Maussian: there is no disinterested gift. 
Problematically, however, the text with which we must work does not 
offer explicit commentary on gift giving: none of our textual evidence 
seems to indicate social dynamics in giving at a level more direct than 
observer, nor can we accurately determine the value of a gift (is a gold 
cup worth more than a dyed belt, a silver-studded sword?). Donlan 
continues by writing that, “the emphasis on competition and display in 
Homeric gift giving might seem exaggerated, had we not numerous 
parallels from big-man and chieftain societies world-wide.”100 Again, I 
argue, Donlan runs into problems. His assertion that competition is 
exaggerated in Homer lacks textual support: where do we read any 
notion of competitiveness in giving? Most, if not all gifts given in the 
Iliad are written without agonistic elements. One might argue that 
Agamemnon’s offer in Book 9 and Priam’s ransom for Hektor, are guilty 
of being competitive, but these are isolated cases: no other characters 
offer such gifts as these. If this emphasis is present in the Odyssey, it 
serves as an illustration of why a study of gift giving in Homer must 
necessarily take each text as separate: for what may be present in one of 
the texts is absent from the other, leaving a universalising conclusion 
 
100 Donlan 1997: 663. 
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impossible. Secondly, Donlan’s limiting term is dôra, which does not 
cover all instances of gift giving in the Iliad: xeineion, for example, are 
perfectly valid gifts to include, especially since they are specific to certain 
situations. And indeed, many scholars will include as gifts those scenes 
which lack any gift term at all, and these will be examined in the 
following section.   
 Especially interesting for our discussion here is the use of dôra to 
describe some of the items offered by Agamemnon to Achilles, to which 
we will now turn, advancing the argument that since gift terms are used 
in situations where the thing given is clearly not a gift (i.e. a freely given 
thing, either truly or only imagined by the participants and/or 
observers), the use of gift terms must serve an aesthetic purpose. 
Throughout the Iliad, no fewer than nineteen (out of a total of seventy-
three) instances of gift terms are used refer specifically to parts of 
Agamemnon’s long list of ‘gifts’ which he wishes to offer Achilles.101 As 
Donna Wilson has argued, the Embassy scene of Book 9 is highly 
dependent on the use of the words apoina and poinê; Agamemnon 
consciously “deploys none of the language typically associated with 
 
101 The count of seventy-three instances of gift terms includes the words dôron, dosis, 
and xeineion 
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poinê,” and instead chooses to use the word apoina in order to frame the 
offerings in a certain way.102 Indeed, as she writes later,  
 
Perhaps most telling, offers of apoina conventionally 
presuppose a situation of hostility; apoina are never in the 
discrete themes exchanged between philoi. By offering apoina 
to Achilleus, Agamemnon casts him in the thematic role of the 
enemy.103  
 
This apoina, however, is referred to as a dôra by Agamemnon, 
Nestor, Odysseus, and Achilles (Il. 9.121, 164, 261, 378 
respectively).104 This seems to me to show one of two things (or even 
both). On the one hand, if we are to take Wilson’s analysis of the 
difference between apoina and poinê, it would seem that a gift is 
equal to apoina. And this is not the only case in the poem where 
this seems to be the case: when Priam is gathering gifts (dôra; e.g. 
Il. 24.77, 119, 176) to bring to Achilles, these gifts are specifically 
thought of as a ransom (apoina; e.g. Il. 24.555, 579) for Hektor.105 
 
102 Wilson 2002: 76. 
103 Wilson 2002: 78. 
104 Lattimore translates axia dôra (Il. 9.261) as ‘worthy recompense’, illustrating the 
desire to economise the gift.  
105 Up until Priam actually meets with Achilles, Priam refers to the things gathered as 
dôra (and indeed, when Zeus himself sets this plan in motion, he refers to the things 
Priam will offer to Achilles as gifts). Once Priam is in the presence of Achilles, 
however, he abandons the use of gift terms in order to employ the word apoina.  
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What this would mean, I believe, is that a gift is not freely given, 
for apoina are, by definition, not something that is freely given. The 
specific uses of the gift term, especially in Priam’s ransom of 
Hektor’s body, seem to suggest, however, that the use of the gift 
terms is highly meaningful. The context in the two ransom scenes 
seems to elicit a certain important distinction. On the one hand, 
Agamemnon and the others choose to call his offerings ‘gifts’ in 
order to conceal (ineffectually) the true nature of his offer, while 
Priam seems to switch away from using it to Achilles in order to 
express proper deference and etiquette given the situation.  
 It seems to me, then, that the category of ‘gift’ in the Iliad is 
more complicated than a reductionist political analysis would 
allow—the language of the gift giving scenes must be important 
in the understanding of the scene, and this transference between 
dôra and apoina illustrates that the gift in the epic is not 
understood as simply something perceived as freely-given.106 
 
 
106 This equation of gifts with another form of non-gift is investigated in Newton 2009, 
where he compares the geras with the guest-gift in an inter-poetic analysis between 
both of the Homeric epics, showing that such a transference was an oral-traditional 
feature that “allow[ed] the poet compositional flexibility.” If Newton is right, this 
flexibility poses a problem for interpretations of Homeric gift giving as fully-formed 
social practices: essentially, if they are used as synonyms of other overtly economic 
modes of exchange, it might be nearly impossible to distinguish gifts from non-gifts.  
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3.2.3 THINGS GIVEN 
Following the logic of the previous section, we will now turn to 
exchanges which do not use a gift term in their description of the thing 
given, but which can still benefit from being read when attentive to the 
language of the scene.  
The first instance of a definite object being given in the Iliad (2.102-
107) is a genealogical account of how Agamemnon came to possess his 
sceptre which gives him power over the other Greeks. The poet traces 
its origins from Zeus, who gave it to Hermes, who then gave it to 
Pelops, from whom it was passed down within the family. In each case 
except two the verb didômi is used to signify the passing of the sceptre. 
The verb first changes when the sceptre goes from Atreus to Thyestes. 
Instead of the so-far customary didômi, the poet switches to the verb 
leipô ‘to leave’: Ἀτρεὺς δὲ θνῄσκων ἔλιπεν πολύαρνι Θυέστῃ, “And 
Atreus, dying, left it to lamb-rich Thyestes” (Il. 2.106). In the following 
line the verb remains leipô: αὐτὰρ ὁ αὖτε Θυέστ᾽ Ἀγαμέμνονι λεῖπε 
φορῆναι…, “And moreover, Thyestes left it to Agamemnon to carry…” 
(Il. 2.107). In this change of verb, we can detect a subtle hint that the 
sceptre has gone from a willing gift to an unwilling one. One has to look 
no further than the mythical history of this family to see that between 
Atreus and Pelops it is unlikely that a gift of such power (the 
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consequence of the sceptre seems to be the right to rule the Greeks 
widely, Il. 2.108) would willingly be given from Atreus to Thyestes or 
from Thyestes to the sons of Atreus.107 This idea of the scepter being 
given unwillingly has not gone unnoticed: a scholiast comments, “τὸ μὲν 
γὰρ δῶκε φιλίας τεκμήριον φησι, τὸ δὲ καταλειπεῖν ἀνάγκης” (for he 
[Homer] says ‘gave’ as a sign of friendship, but ‘left behind’ as a sign of 
necessity).108 It can be no coincidence that the verb changes from one 
with active tones to one which is passive at precisely the moment of 
familial conflict.109  
 What are we to make of the scholiast’s comment on the distinction 
between friendly giving and giving out of necessity? It is true that in 
these lines the distinction between willingly giving something and 
unwillingly leaving something to another is made clear through word 
choice. This distinction, however, does not necessarily hold for the rest 
of the poem. Agamemnon’s returning of Chryseis illustrates this point. 
Although Agamemnon uses the verb didômi, the giving back of Chyseis, 
 
107 On the implications of this unwilling bequeathal of Agamemnon’s right to rule the 
Greeks, see Stocking (forthcoming). 
108 Σ ad loc. The scholiast misquotes the text in his exegesis, for in our version of Homer 
we have the non-prefixed form leipô where the scholiast uses a prefixed version. 
109 Unfortunately, there are no instances in the Iliad which use leipô to designate a gift 
which is left to another, although there are a number of instances of the incorporeal 
being left to someone: ἐμοὶ δὲ μάλιστα λελείψεται ἄλγεα λυγρά (“the greatest mournful 
pains have been left to me [Priam]”, Il. 24.746). These usages, however, do not offer us 
a suitable comparison. 
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which is only brought about by necessity, is not one which can be 
described as friendly (Il. 1.116). Furthermore, during scenes of ransom, 
characters make use of that very word, which is supposed to imply 
friendliness or willingness, neither of which is present in such a 
situation: the parents are bound by necessity to give ransom (most 
famously at Il. 24.594, where Achilleus comments that Priam gave him 
worthy ransom for the body of Hektor, but also at Il. 1.95; 9.120; 19.138; 
24.686). How can the account Mauss and Donlan put forward be 
squared to this example?  
 
3.2.4 MISCELLANEOUS 
 We can also briefly consider here the formulaic refrain “καὶ ὕπνου 
δῶρον ἕλοντο” (Il. 7.482, 9.713; Od. 16.481, 19.427: and they took the gift 
of sleep), which appears twice each in the Iliad and Odyssey. This 
adnominal genitive is itself not as problematic,110 but the idea of sleep as 
something taken is. In Homer (and elsewhere), sleep is something with 
its own agency: it is what compels both man and god to sleep (e.g. Il. 
 
110 The use of the adnominal genitive has been used as evidence both for and against 
the interpolation of the end of Sophocles’ O.T. See e.g. Dawe 2001: 6–7; Kovacs 2009: 
56. See Nussbaum 1998: 126–127 for the view that the adnominal genitive was a late 
feature of the Homeric Kunstsprache. 
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2.2, 2.24, 10.4, 22.502; Od. 5.472, 7.286, 15.7).111 Not only is this refrain the 
only instance of sleep not showing agency in Homer, we also have here 
the only instance of a gift being taken by someone in the Iliad. In the 
Odyssey, however, apart from the two refrains cited above, Odysseus says 
  
      σὺ δέ με προΐεις καὶ πότνια μήτηρ  
ἐς πατέρ’ Αὐτόλυκον μητρὸς φίλον, ὄφρ’ ἂν ἑλοίμην 
δῶρα, τὰ δεῦρο μολών μοι ὑπέσχετο καὶ κατένευσεν.   
Od. 24.333–335 
 
      “You and [my] mistress mother sent me 
to Autolykos, mother’s dear father, so that I might take112 
the gifts, which, having come here, he promised to me.” 
 
In these examples, what is striking is the claim that gifts will be taken, 
something which goes against the very nature of a gift as something 
given. 
 
 
 
 
111 Although I am using neuter pronouns in this section, it should be mentioned that 
sleep is also personified as Hypnos, a god (as in Il. 14.233 where Hera appeals to him 
directly).  
112 Lattimore (2007: ad loc) renders this verb, aireô in Greek, as “so that I could be 
given”, though the verb, even in the middle voice, does not reflect the action of ‘being 
given’. 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
In this section I have aimed to show that major theories of gift exchange 
do not perfectly fit the instances of gift giving in the Iliad. Furthermore, 
the lack of consistency throughout the Iliad in differentiating a gift from 
other forms of economic exchange causes problems for the rigid 
structuralist approaches that these theories require, and the examples 
with which we must work offer only a small instance of a durational 
practice between donor and recipient, which does not allow us to read 
the entire practice as is necessary. Furthermore, because there are so few 
instances of individual gifts in the poem, creating an accurate, universal 
theory of gift giving is impossible. 
 Instead, I argued that we should be attentive to the use or avoidance 
of gift terms in scenes of exchange. Reading scenes in this way can allow 
for new readings of gift giving scenes. This approach was illustrated by 
consideration of two major scenes of ransom which both feature the 
word dôron throughout, even though the offerings are clearly not what 
can be considered gifts. Furthermore, as the passing of the Atreid family 
scepter illustrates, reading scenes without gift terms in the same way is 
profitable—even the use of a different verb can signal the change in 
mood of a gift exchange. In these ways, our readings of these scenes 
 
 
74 
extend beyond the social, political, or economic realms—the use of gift 
giving can serve a poetical purpose.  
 In the following chapter, I will use this method of analysis in a 
focused case study in order to illustrate the benefits of reading gift giving 
scenes while being attendant to the language of the poem.  
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3 
THE DIOMEDES & GLAUKOS EXCHANGE 
 
 
 
n the previous chapters, I showed that reading gift giving scenes 
from an aesthetic point of view can offer profitable readings 
beyond or in addition to the reductive political readings of the 
scenes. In this final chapter, I aim to provide a detailed aesthetic reading 
of a single scene from the Iliad to show the benefits of this approach.  
 
In Book 6 of the Iliad (119–236) there occurs a scene of great importance 
for our discussion. At the end of Diomedes’ aristeia, the Lykian warrior 
Glaukos comes forward to challenge him in single combat. What ensues 
is a scene of recognition during which, on account of the genealogy 
offered by Glaukos, Diomedes recognizes that the two of them are 
connected through a two-generation-old bond of hospitality (Il. 6.119–
211). Following this recognition comes the exchange in which Glaukos 
gives to Diomedes a golden panoply and in return receives a bronze 
panoply from Diomedes (Il. 6.230–236). 
I 
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 This exchange episode between Diomedes and Glaukos has caused 
problems of interpretation: the poet of the received text inserts his own 
explanation for the unequal exchange, a rare occurrence in both the Iliad 
and Odyssey, as well as the Homeric Hymns (Il. 6.234).113 Calder remarks 
of this narratorial insertion that by the time Plato was writing, the 
expression chrusea chalkeiôn	(“gold for the price of bronze”) “had become 
an elegant reference to an unfair bargain.”114 Indeed, Plato makes 
Socrates quote from this episode in the Symposium (218e–219a) in order 
to reprimand Alcibiades for trying to obtain for himself the better side 
of a trade, notably a trade involving the non-corporeal exchange of an 
Ideal (Symp. 218d–e). Aristotle too takes it upon himself in the 
Nicomachean Ethics (1136b5–10) to comment on the episode, writing that: 
 
ὁ δὲ τὰ αὑτοῦ διδούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός φησι δοῦναι τὸν Γλαῦκον 
τῷ Διομήδει “χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων,” οὐκ 
ἀδικεῖται: ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ γάρ ἐστι τὸ διδόναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐκ 
ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ 
ἀδικεῖσθαι, ὅτι οὐχ ἑκούσιον, δῆλον.115 
Arist. Eth. Nic. 1136b 
 
113 See ad loc. in Graziosi and Haubold 2010; Fortson 2010: §2.12. 
114 Calder 1984: 31. This claim is complicated by the fact that the expression occurs 
nowhere else. 
115 Aristotle, in his discussion of the scene, uses the verb didômi, perhaps suggesting 
that he was thinking of the passage as representative of a typical scene of giving and 
avoids engaging with the problematic text.  
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He who gives his own things, just as Homer says that Glaukos 
gave to Diomedes “gold for bronze, a hecatomb for nine oxen,” 
does not suffer injustice: for giving is a personal choice, and 
suffering injustice is not self-inflicted, but it is necessary that 
someone undertake being unjust. Therefore, it is clear that, 
concerning being treated unjustly, it is not a willing thing.  
 
 In a note in The Classical Review, J. D. Craig argues that there is no 
problem with the exchange: Glaukos “was conscious of his inferiority in 
the presence of the overbearing Diomede... he was heartily glad to part 
from his new friend, even at the price of gold for bronze.”116 To Craig’s 
reading, P. Walcot adds that Glaukos “is very willing to hand over to 
Diomede[s] armour, however valuable, in return for a gift infinitely 
more precious, his own life.”117 These two scholars, as Walcot puts it, 
“seek a human motive to explain Glaucos’ action.”118 Although the 
appeal to human emotion as a solution holds a certain amount of 
empathetic reasoning, we might also here mention Willcocks’ 
declaration that “it is not difficult to deduce that Glaucus is nervous,” 
arguing that “we should not let the pathos of the parallel with leaves, 
and the fascination of the fable of Bellerophon, blind us to the fact that 
 
116 Craig 1967: 244. 
117 Walcot 1969: 12–13. 
118 Walcot 1969: 12. 
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Glaucus is maundering.”119 Even so, it is an established narrative feature 
of Homeric epic to diverge from the main narrative in such a descriptive 
fashion, as Auerbach’s “The Scar of Odysseus” shows us.120 I believe that 
looking for emotional reasons for Glaukos’ unequal exchange departs 
too far from the textual evidence to be a defensible position. Nowhere 
in the text of the exchange do we have any evidence for Glaukos’ 
emotional state being the motivating factor for his willingness to 
participate in the exchange. Indeed, if we are concerned with the 
emotional state of the participants, we might recall that Diomedes, right 
before the epiphany and offer, rejoiced (gêthêthen Il. 6.212) upon hearing 
the news which lead to their armistice. We could argue that Diomedes 
was glad he need not fight against the superior Glaukos. Furthermore, 
if, as Vernant argues, the hero faces dishonour by showing cowardice, 
we might find it hard to believe that Glaukos would take this path:121 
for Glaukos seems to have challenged Diomedes of his own accord (Il. 
 
119 Willcock 1992: 87. Cf. Alden 2000: 167, “The career of Bellerophon functions as a 
paradigmatic warning to Diomedes as he listens to it: Bellerophon enjoyed 
extraordinary favour from the gods, but this favour was suddenly withdrawn in an 
apparently arbitrary fashion, and the same thing might happen to Diomede, who has 
been achieving remarkable feats under the patronage of Athene just before he hears 
about Bellerophon.” There does not seem to be any idea in Alden of Glaukos 
maundering out of fear, but as we will see below, the genealogy, and important part of 
heroic identification, served a deeper narrative purpose than merely Glaukos buying 
time. See also generally Alden 2000: 128–142. 
120 Auerbach 2003: ch. 1 passim. 
121 Vernant 1991: 51. 
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6.119-126) and takes seriously his honour (Il. 6.206–210). Indeed, 
throughout the Iliad, Diomedes is never said to be afraid, or depicted as 
acting unheroically.122 Should we thus ascribe to Glaukos a feeling of 
inferiority in the face of Diomedes? In effect, the argument advanced by 
these scholars, I argue, is too dependent on appeals to emotions which 
are not mentioned in the text and which go against the received textual 
evidence concerning Glaukos’ cowardice. In this vein de Jong argues 
that the exposition of Glaukos’ genealogy serves two purposes: he claims 
to be equal to Diomedes in terms of heroic lineage and also reminds 
himself of the conduct by which he must abide, being a descendant in 
such a noble family.123 This, she argues, shows that Glaukos is self-
confident in his own equality to Diomedes, he is unafraid of the 
anticipated duel.  
 
122 We are told of Glaukos that he is second-in-command to Sarpedon of the Lykians 
(Il. 2.876); that he had advanced to the ‘no-man’s land’ of the idealised battlefield in 
which heroes seek single combat (Il. 6.119); that Sarpedon hand-picked Glaukos 
because he was “above all others the bravest” (Il. 12.103–104; “διακρὶδον εἶναι ἄριστοι 
/ τῶν ἄλλων”); that the Lykians considered him to be, along with Sarpedon, the best 
of the Lykians (Il. 12.310–328); Sarpedon, dying, calls him a “fighter among men” 
(πολεμιστὰ μετ᾽ ἀνδράσι, Il. 16.492); he is the first of the Lykians to turn back toward 
the onslaught of Patroklos (Il. 16.593–594); he is able, unlike Thersites’ attempt with 
Agamemnon, to reproach Hektor (Il. 17.140–168); and he is given the epithet 
‘blameless’ (Il. 2.876, 14.426, perhaps inherited or projected backward onto his 
grandfather Bellerophon, Il. 6.155). The only time he retreats is after he has been 
injured, while scaling the Greek wall (Il. 12.387–391). 
123 de Jong 1987: 160–167 
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 William M. Calder argues the opposite: “Diomedes, after hearing the 
glorious lineage and noble attainments of Glaucos…admits by his offer 
of the unequal exchange Glaucos’ superiority.”124 Calder argues this by 
asserting that the giver of the superior gift is himself superior,125 using 
Achilles’ refusal of Agamemnon’s offer and acceptance of Priam’s offer 
as analogous examples, which supposedly illustrate this power 
dynamic.126 Firstly, we must note that these two ‘analogous’ scenes lack 
the same linguistic features of the Diomedes-Glaukos scene: in our case 
we have an exchange of full armour, taken to be a gift compared against 
the payment of apoina, ransom, in the Achilles scenes (Il. 9.120; 
24.502).127 The difference is crucial: one may refuse to accept a ransom, 
as happens in the Iliad,128 but nowhere do we find a gift rejected.129 In 
fact, Walter Donlan writes that “giving is never meant to overawe or to 
display superiority,”130 a fact, which apart from Agamemnon’s offer, 
holds true throughout the Iliad. 
 
124 Calder 1984: 34. 
125 Calder 1984: 34. 
126 Calder 1984: 34. 
127 See Wilson 1999 for a fuller discussion of apoina (and poinê) in the Iliad. 
128 In addition to Achilles’ refusal, we might cite Il. 6.46ff in which apoina was offered 
by a captured Trojan, and it was rejected in favour of killing the man. 
129 Compare with Mauss 1970: 11, who argues that rejection of a gift was impossible 
without detrimental consequences.  
130 Donlan 1989: 9. This statement is contradicted in his 2011: 663 chapter, in which 
he claims that Homeric giving is competitive and exaggerated. If participants in gift 
giving are to remain equal, many of the approaches to this episode are misguided in 
their attempts to determine a ‘winner’ of the exchange. 
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 Some have chosen to seek an explanation for the unequal exchange 
by recourse to potlatch societies.131 The idea behind this comes, no 
doubt, from a misapplication of Mauss’ research. Mauss’ 
anthropological investigations dealt with a few American tribes who 
practiced potlatch, which Mauss describes as follows:  
 
But, in these two latter tribes of the American Northwest, and 
throughout this region, there appears to be a form of these 
total prestations that is characteristic, certainly, but more 
developed and relatively rare… But what is remarkable in these 
tribes is the principle of rivalry and antagonism that dominated 
all these practices. People go so far as to fight, even killing 
chiefs and nobles who confront each other in this way. 
Furthermore, they go so far as to destroy any accumulated 
wealth in a purely extravagant manner in order to outdo a 
chief, simultaneously a rival and a partner (usually a 
grandfather, father-in-law, or son-in-law).132  
 
The characteristics of potlatch which Mauss notes are altogether absent 
both from this isolated exchange, as well as from all other instances of 
gift giving in the Iliad: there is no hint of rivalry in the language of our 
scene; no deliberate destruction of property—in fact the passage 
 
131 Calder 1984. 
132 Mauss 1925 [2016]: 62–63. 
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suggests that they will each keep and use the armour of the other; and 
instead of fighting one another, they abstain from doing so. Moreover, 
this “relatively rare” practice, described by Mauss, is rooted in ritual 
communal feasting which takes place during the winters in North 
American native tribes during the 19th and 20th centuries BC, a social 
engagement quite different from that of Diomedes and Glaukos. If 
indeed the potlatch was the mode of exchange which is represented in 
the Iliad, we might ask ourselves: why does Diomedes then propose the 
trade, knowing that under the social rules of potlatch, Glaukos’ by far 
larger gift of reciprocation will dishonour him so much?  
 Other approaches to the episode read it more aesthetically. Gaisser 
argues that the two heroes are put against each other for the moral effect 
of their differing world-views.133 For Gaisser, Diomedes represents an 
optimistic world-view in which mortals who appropriately honour the 
gods will never be punished, whereas Glaukos represents a pessimistic 
view, one in which mortals will, regardless of piety, fall victim to the 
gods.134 Agreeing with Gaisser, Scodel concludes that the two speeches 
delivered by the heroes represent two competing views of the 
relationship between mortal and divine, concluding that Glaukos’ “own 
 
133 Gaisser 1969: 175. 
134 Gaisser 1969: 175. 
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loss in the exchange of armor is a mild and almost funny proof of an 
important and usually tragic truth,” viz. the mutability of the gods’ 
favour for mortals.135 Problematically, however, Scodel does not account 
for why Glaukos must come out the worse in this situation. At the time 
of the episode, he is not said to be in the gods’ favour or to be receiving 
divine aid, and the mutability of the gods’ favour would be better 
illustrated in Diomedes ‘losing out’, since he has been favoured by the 
gods for a long while at this point. 
 Although these two arguments are, in my opinion, excellent literary 
readings, we are left still with our original question: why do the two 
warriors exchange their armour? Gaisser, who believes that the episode 
between Diomedes and Glaukos should be read as part of a ring 
composition with the Achilles-Priam scene in Book 24, writes: 
 
At this point we are reminded of the remarks of Willcock and 
Kakridis on the story of Niobe. "Niobe eats because Priam 
must eat."136 In the present context, then, Bellerophon and 
Oineus must exchange gifts because Diomedes and Glaucus are 
to exchange armor.137 
 
135 Scodel 1992: 84. 
136 Willcock 1964: 141, citing Kakridis 1949: 99 
137 Gaisser 1969: 175. 
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Although the ring composition of these two episodes is quite nice, we 
are left with what seems to be a circular argument. For the pair (viz. 
Diomedes and Glaukos) do not need to give each other their armour in 
the same way that Priam, being a mortal beholden to biological needs, 
must eat. And further, the two can fulfil the ring composition by 
exchanging something else with one another. Although the connection 
between the episodes in Book 6 and 24 are literarily related, that fact 
alone does not fully explain the exchange between Diomedes and 
Glaukos. In order to expand the reading, we must analyse the scene’s 
language, which the heretofore mentioned commenters all pass over.  
 My own approach to this scene will be based, much like the previous 
sections of this paper, heavily on the language of the episode. Namely, 
I will first examine closely the language of the scene and how it compares 
to the language of the other instances of gift giving in our text. This will 
allow us to consider the scene independently of modern theory, and how 
it relates to similar language elsewhere in the poem, putting the 
emphasis on the traditional use of words more than on the entire 
‘feeling’ of the scene. 
 The scene is composed of two layers of narration: we have direct 
speech from the participants and narratorial comments. Furthermore, 
we might also divide the narratorial lines into ‘early’ and ‘later’, including 
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in the latter category the lines at 6.235–236 on the grounds that they were 
composed by a later poet who did not understand the scene.138 Whether 
the scene is comprised of two or three levels of narration is a minor 
point, however, and will not affect our analysis. The important 
distinction is that we have, as Levi-Strauss and Bourdieu point out, a 
problem of objectivism: namely, the narratorial comments are akin to 
anthropological observation, the practices are seen from an outside 
perspective that can only offer an ultimately subjective account. In our 
case the comments about Zeus stealing Glaukos’ phrenas and the 
problematic value discrepancy serve only to illustrate the subjective 
understanding of the exchange. That is, the participants and the narrator 
have differing views about the nature of the practice which has taken 
place: indeed, Diomedes claims that they will (ex)change (into) the 
armour of the other in order to boast their guest-friendship, and leaves 
out any notion of value, whilst the poet draws attention to the superior 
value. 
 “Homeric characters often invoke Zeus when they try to account for 
events they do not understand… Here it seems that the poet himself is 
 
138 See Calder 1984: 34, who argues that “the Geometric poet no longer understood 
the custom,” with the implication being that the original passage entered the tradition 
at a much earlier point in time. 
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puzzled by the implications of the exchange.”139 Similarly, Benjamin 
Fortson writes that, “the narrator of the tale, interestingly, seems not to 
understand the proceedings, and claims that Glaukos’ wits were addled.” 
Fortson argues that the excessive value discrepancy is explained away as 
repayment of a debt incurred two generations ago when his grandfather 
was hosted by Oineus.140 Problematically, the Iliad does not offer us any 
comparisons against which to judge the veracity of this explanation: 
nowhere are we told the values of each item given nor are we told by 
characters or by the narrator that Glaukos is repaying a debt to 
Diomedes. Instead, I think that Godelier’s insightful comment about 
mutual indebtedness is especially applicable not only in this case, but in 
general consideration of gifts in the Iliad.141 Godelier convincingly 
argues that giving is not an economic transaction, in that one party need 
not repay exactly what the other had given, but instead the goal is that 
each party will be bound to the other. If Fortson’s suggestion were 
correct, it would effectively mean that gift giving played no prolonged 
role in social relations: once the recipient paid the donor an equivalent 
amount for the original gift, the two would revert to whatever state 
 
139 Graziosi and Haubold 2010, ad loc.  
140 Fortson 2010: 2.12. See also Calder 1984: 34 “the Geometric poet no longer 
understood the custom.” 
141 Godelier 1999: 48. 
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existed between them before the original gift had been given and 
accepted.142 Diomedes’ claim that the two would continue to serve as 
guest-friends in the future serves as evidence of this mutual indebtedness 
rather than a simple repayment and assumed dissolution of bonds (Il. 
6.225–226).143 Furthermore, Fortson’s main evidence for his 
interpretation is only linguistic: he has created a rule out of the 
implications of word-roots. Although Indo-European linguistics can be 
profitable in a number of cases (especially diachronic contexts), most of 
the time the data with which they work is not enough to allow full 
reconstruction of social practices.  
 Again, too, if we wish to evoke Mauss, we will find at once that this 
profit-driven mentality should not be taken into account: Mauss’ 
research demonstrates that profit is something which is to be avoided.144 
And indeed, gift giving in the Iliad seems to work on the same premise. 
In Book 1, when Achilles and Agamemnon begin their strife, Achilles’ 
insult to Agamemnon, calling him philoktêanôtate, lover of gain, (Il. 
1.122) can be seen as expressive of the norms: it was uncouth, at least for 
heroes, to desire the acquisition of physical goods for profit. 
 
142 Cf. Godelier 1999: 42–43, on counter-gifts not erasing the debt of the original gift. 
143 cf. the gifts given between Hektor and Aias which do not successfully establish a 
bond that transcends their status of war-time enemies.  
144 Sahlins 1997: 79–80. 
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Furthermore, apart from the sole line (Il. 6.236), inserted by a narrator, 
there is no mention of profitability or value made of gifts given by the 
participants; can we then apply modern economic values onto this text, 
simply because we now have a tendency to view things in such a way?  
 Furthermore, we must take into account the role played by time in 
gift giving. Firstly, we must note Mauss’ work. When Mauss introduced 
the theory of the hau, relying on the Ranaipiri text, he failed to make 
notice of the specific line “après qu’un certain temps s’est écoulé…”145 
Indeed, the issue of time is taken up by Pierre Bourdieu in his The Logic 
of Practice:  
So long as one only considers practices which, like rituals, 
derive some of their most important properties from the fact 
that they are “detotalized” by their unfolding in succession, one 
is liable to neglect those properties of practice that 
detemporalizing science has least chance of reconstituting, 
namely the properties it owes to the fact that it is constructed 
in time, that time gives it its form…”146  
 
How are we to reconcile this exchange (and others) in the Iliad where 
the reciprocation is immediate? Do these not go against the idea 
Bourdieu has in mind when he talks about the importance of time in 
 
145 Mauss 1950: 158. 
146 Bourdieu 1990: 98. 
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gift giving, the power dynamics that result from an early reciprocation 
or a late one? Furthermore, we have also to contend with the fact that 
the majority of gifts given in the Iliad are entirely ‘totalised’ as single 
instances: we do not have access to the practice’s full history, so to speak. 
The problem arises that no single theory of gift giving accurately 
reflects all of the instances: the very thing which a theory ought to do, 
whether it be mathematical or anthropological. And indeed, in this 
passage there is something strikingly unmathematical, something to 
which we ought to pay attention, but which has been passed over 
without comment by scholars thus far: namely the language the poet 
uses in this scene. 
 The passage is notable for its multiple instances of idiosyncratic 
language. Though it is interpreted by readers to be a standard gift 
exchange, the passage lacks all sense of linguistic similarity to other gift 
giving scenes in the Iliad. Of these, two scenes provide exact structural 
analogues to the scene which we will be considering: namely, they both 
involve one hero giving a gift to another, and then the immediate 
reciprocation of that gift. Before we turn to these two analogous scenes, 
let us first introduce the one on which we will be focused. It comes after 
the above-mentioned exposition of lineage delivered by Glaukos’ and 
Diomedes’ recognition-scene speech:  
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Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσαντε καθ’ ἵππων ἀΐξαντε 
χεῖράς τ’ ἀλλήλων λαβέτην καὶ πιστώσαντο·147 
ἔνθ’ αὖτε Γλαύκῳ Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, 
 ὃς πρὸς Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα τεύχε’ ἄμειβε 
χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι’ ἐννεαβοίων 
Il. 6.230–236 
 
“But let us exchange panoplies with one another, so that 
 they might  
know that we boast to be paternal guest-friends.” 
And so, the two having spoken, jumped down from their 
 horses 
and took the hands of the other and trusted each other. 
And then Zeus, son of Kronos, stole away the mind from 
 Glaukos, 
he exchanged panoplies with Diomedes, son of Tydeus, 
gold for the price of bronze, a hecatomb for nine oxen.148 
 
 The first instance (both earliest in terms of the internal chronology of 
the story as well as being the first to appear in the poem) which provides 
us with a structural analogue occurs in an embedded speech. Diomedes, 
 
147 On the word pistôsanto see Graziosi and Haubold ad loc. Cf. FlgrE s.v. pistôsasthai; 
cf. also Il. 19.191 where Agamemnon says that they will orkia pista tamômen “let us 
make faithful oaths.”  
148 Interestingly, the translation in Stoevesandt 2008: ad loc. renders the Gk. teuchea 
with Germ. Waffen, ‘weapons’. 
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after hearing Glaukos’ noble lineage, rejoices (gêthêsen, Il. 6.212) and 
says:  
 
ἦ ῥά νύ μοι ξεῖνος πατρώϊός ἐσσι παλαιός· 
Οἰνεὺς γάρ ποτε δῖος ἀμύμονα Βελλεροφόντην 
ξείνισ’ ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐείκοσιν ἤματ’ ἐρύξας· 
οἳ δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλοισι πόρον ξεινήϊα καλά· 
Οἰνεὺς μὲν ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν,  
Βελλεροφόντης δὲ χρύσεον δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον 
καί μιν ἐγὼ κατέλειπον ἰὼν ἐν δώμασ’ ἐμοῖσι. 
 Il. 6.214–221 
  
“It seems that you are my old paternal guest-friend;  
For divine Oineus once hosted blameless Bellerophon 
in his halls, having kept him for twenty days. 
And they gave each other beautiful guest-gifts. 
Oineus gave a war-belt, shining red, 
and Bellerophon a golden two-handed cup,149 
and coming [here], I left it behind at my house.” 
 
The second analogue occurs in the following book, between Aias and 
Hektor after their duel has been cut short by Zeus, who sent messengers 
 
149 For a recent discussion of this cup type in the archaeological records, see Bloedow 
2007. 
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and night to stop the fight so that neither hero would die (Il. 7.273–282). 
At the end of their duel, Hektor says: 
 
δῶρα δ’ ἄγ’ ἀλλήλοισι περικλυτὰ δώομεν ἄμφω... 
Ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας δῶκε ξίφος ἀργυρόηλον 
σὺν κολεῷ τε φέρων καὶ ἐϋτμήτῳ τελαμῶνι· 
Αἴας δὲ ζωστῆρα δίδου φοίνικι φαεινόν 
Il. 7.299; 303–305 
 
“But come, let us both give glorious gifts to each other...” 
And, so, having spoken, he gave a silver-studded sword 
with both the sheath and well-cut belt. 
And Aias gave a war-belt, shining red.   
 
Right away we notice the dissimilarity of language between the original 
passage and the two analogues. In the two analogous scenes the nouns 
and verbs used by the poet are expressly related both to gifts and to the 
act of giving. We find xeineion (Il. 6.216), didômi (Il. 6.216, 7.299, 7.303, 
7.305), dôron (Il. 7.299). The first, as we noted above is the only noun to 
which we can safely ascribe a specific type of gift giving: it is 
etymologically connected to the guest-host relationship. The latter 
words, though not intrinsically connected to some specific type of gift 
giving, are both etymologically related to the act of giving in general. 
Both come from the same root, *deh3(r/n)-, which has been 
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reconstructed as meaning in its verbal form as “to give” and in its 
nominal form as “gift”.150 When considering other, non-analogous, 
exchanges (in which the gift is not immediately reciprocated), we also 
find in each case the use of one or both reflexes of the *deh3(r/n)- root.  
 This, however, does not hold true for the famous exchange between 
Diomedes and Glaukos. Instead, we find the verb (ep)ameibô and then 
object-noun teuchea. Given that the institution is commonly called ‘gift 
exchange’, this use of ameibô (“to exchange”) seems not to pose any real 
issues in our interpretation of the passage as one of regular gift giving.151 
Under further scrutiny, however, we find that this verb is problematic. 
Etymologically we are on uncertain footing with this verb: modern 
etymologies reconstruct the root as PIE *h2meigw (“to exchange”).152 This 
root is not unproblematic, however, for it is constructed on the basis of 
a single reflex in the daughter languages (viz. Gk. ameibô) and lacks any 
cognates against which one might compare the meaning.153 The strength 
of the comparative method depends on just that: comparison. The 
 
150 Mallory and Addams 2006: 270, 273. Benveniste (1973: 54) gives the root of both 
as *do. 
151 To add to this problem of understanding, it does not help that our word ‘exchange’ 
comes not from Greek, but from a Latin root, cambire (perhaps itself of Celtic origin), 
meaning ‘to barter’, which has clear economic implications.  
152 On the etymology see Beekes and van Beek 2009: s.v. ἀμείβω; Rix 1998 s.v. ἀμείβω 
153 The merit of these reconstructions has been rightly questioned by e.g. Seebold 1999 
(with specific reference to Rix). 
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problems which result from reconstruction from only a single reflex are 
evident when we consider the wide semantic fields of reflexes in a 
number of daughter languages.154 With only one reflex for the proposed 
root of ameibô, etymologies reconstruct the PIE root as meaning the same 
thing as the Greek reflex. Problematically, however, the definition of 
‘exchange (of corporeal objects)’ is rooted in use much later than 
Homer.155  
 Ameibô appears throughout the Iliad, occurring no fewer than 170 
times (including prefixed forms such as epameibô). Instead of 
predominantly occurring in exchange scenarios of physical items, be 
they gifts or otherwise, 125 (73.5%) of these instances are the narrator 
introducing a verbal reply with a handful of formulaic phrases which 
seem not to bear any relation to the nature of the reply or to the speech 
 
154 To take an example of a word we have already come across, PrSlav. *rečь ‘speech’ 
survives in various Slavic daughters as meaning ‘speech’ (OCS, Ru.), ‘word’ (SCr.), 
‘language’ (Bulg., USrb.), and ‘thing’ (Sln., Pl.). Although all these reflexes are 
somewhat related, they vary enough to illustrate the problems which might arise: if, 
for instance, only Slovene and Polish survived, the PrSlav. root would have been 
reconstructed with a different meaning. 
155 In some circumstances ameibô can mean ‘to repay’ (e.g. Od. 24.285; Pindar Pyth. 
7.19; Aesch. Ag. 729, Ch. 793–794; Eur. Cyc. 312), but the verb is never used in a 
context analogous to ours until, at the earliest, Eur. Alc. 46 (438 BCE):  
  Θα. πῶς οὖν ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐστι κοὐ κάτω χθονός; 
  Απ. δάμαρτ’ ἀμείψας, ἣν σὺ νῦν ἥκεις μέτα. 
 
  THA: How is he above the earth, and not under the ground? 
AP: He gave his wife in exchange [sc. for his life], she is now coming to  
you below. 
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to which the reply is made.156 Indeed, speech, especially in the Iliad, 
plays an important role in defining power relations between people.157 
Many of the remaining uses of ameibô are related not to corporeal objects 
being exchanged, but to instances where the essential meaning of 
something like ‘passing back and forth’ is required, without the 
exchange of an object.158  
 When we consider the instances during which ameibô is used of 
corporeal objects we see that it is used exclusively with panoplies 
(teuchea, entea). In Book 14 we encounter a scene describing the 
exchange of armour among the Greeks: 
 
Ὣς ἔφαθ’, οἳ δ’ ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδὲ πίθοντο· 
τοὺς δ’ αὐτοὶ βασιλῆες ἐκόσμεον οὐτάμενοί περ 
Τυδεΐδης Ὀδυσεύς τε καὶ Ἀτρεΐδης Ἀγαμέμνων·  
οἰχόμενοι δ’ ἐπὶ πάντας ἀρήϊα τεύχε’ ἄμειβον· 
ἐσθλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὸς ἔδυνε, χέρεια δὲ χείρονι δόσκεν.159 
 
156 For example, the same formulaic phrase may introduce either a positive or negative 
response, either a superior or inferior replying to the other, etc. Similarly, different 
formulae may also be used for the same response-type. 
157 Bourdieu 1991: 37; Martin 1989 : 22–26; Stocking (forthcoming). 
158 See, e.g. Il. 1.604 where it is used of antiphonal singing; 6.339 where it is used to 
describe how victory passes back and forth between men; 9.409 where the word means 
‘to leave, quit’, with reference to the soul (psyche) leaving the body of a slain hero, 
perhaps returning whence it came in a cyclical conception of the soul. 
159 The idea that one must fight in armour equal to their skill is illustrated by Achilles, 
who cannot fight without armour (Il. 18.188), even though presumably he must have 
access to Patroklos’ armour, or would have been able to, like the Greeks in this scene, 
acquire from the camp a set of armour.  
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Il. 14.378–382 
 
So, he spoke, and they listened to him well and obeyed. 
The kings themselves marshalled the men, though 
they were wounded, Tydeus’ son, Odysseus, and Atreus’ son 
 Agamemnon. 
Going through all the men, they exchanged war panoplies: 
Good men wore good arms, and they gave the worse armour to 
the worse men. 
   
This exchange is brought about because many of the heroes have been 
injured and cannot fight. The implications of this changing-of-armour 
will be discussed below. Later in the poem, after Hektor has slain 
Patroklos and stripped him of Achilles’ armour, we read that:  
  
οἳ προτὶ ἄστυ φέρον κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πηλεΐωνος. 
στὰς δ’ ἀπάνευθε μάχης πολυδακρύου ἔντε’ ἄμειβεν· 
Il. 17.190–191  
 
He was carrying the glorious armour of Peleus’ son to the city. 
Standing apart from tearful battle he changed armour. 
 
What both of these passages show, I argue, is that ameibô is not a word 
connected to gift giving. Indeed, its only uses with a corporeal object in 
the entire poem are connected to exchanging (and, especially, the idea 
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of changing into) the armour of someone else, and especially connected 
with the idea of changing into better armour (i.e. the armour of a better 
fighter). Indeed, this reading of the use of (ep)ameibô is not only rooted 
in the textual use of the verb elsewhere, as shown above, but also the 
most sensical given the situation. The two must wear the armour of the 
other for the lines proclaiming that they will show off their bond to 
make sense (Il. 6.230–231): without wearing the other’s armour, they 
cannot boast to others of their inherited friendship, for nobody would 
see the evidence of it. 
 When we look outside of the poem for evidence of this reading of 
ameibô, we find much the same: in the Homeric Hymns, Hesiod, and 
the early Greek poets, there is no use of ameibô to mean the exchange of 
corporeal goods between parties participating in gift giving. Apart from 
its use in the standard formulaic response-phrase, it occurs only once in 
poetry of the early hexameter tradition with a deviant meaning, in a line 
stressing a change of ontological sorts:  
 
Ὣς εἰποῦσα θεὰ μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος ἄμειψε 
γῆρας ἀπωσαμένη, περί τ’ ἀμφί τε κάλλος ἄητο. 
H.H. Ceres 275–276 
 
So, having spoken, the goddess changed [her] stature and form, 
driving away old age, and beauty breathed all around [her]. 
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To this we can add that in the Lyric poets we find much the same use 
of ameibô. Solon (ca. 640–560),160 for instance, provides two examples of 
non-responsive usages. In fr. 2 (1–2) he writes: 
 
εἴην δὴ τότ᾿ ἐγὼ Φολεγάνδριος ἢ Σικινήτης 
  ἀντί γ᾿ Ἀθηναίου πατρίδ᾿ ἀμειψάμενος· 
 
“Would that I were a Pholegandrian or Skinite 
   instead of an Athenian, changing [my] nationality.” 
 
While in fr. 27 (5–6) he writes: 
 
τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀεξομένων ἔτι γυίων 
  λαχνοῦται, χροιῆς ἄνθος ἀμειβομένης. 
 
“In the third, with this body still growing, his chin 
  grows hair, and with skin changing brightness.” 
 
In these later examples we can see that the idea of a mutational change 
is tied up in the meaning of ameibô. Without this meaning of change, 
the lines would lose meaning.  
 
160 Dates from Allan 2019: 130. 
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 My contention, then, based on these representative examples, is that 
the word ameibô and its prefixed forms, in the early Greek hexameter 
tradition and in lyric, does not semantically mean ‘to exchange physical 
goods’ as both ancient and contemporary critics have interpreted. 
Instead, it seems to me that the traditional meaning of the word, when 
used outside of formulaic-response phrases, is one related to ontological 
change, whether or not that be physical or ‘true’ ontological change as 
Malabou classifies it.161 And so, we have, I think, two options for our 
interpretation of this passage at Il. 6.230–236. On the one hand, we 
might argue that the passage is a later interpolation from a time during 
which ameibô was commonly used in scenarios of exchange between two 
(or more) parties. Indeed, since there are no external quotations of this 
line from before the composition of Plato’s Symposium (which is argued 
to have been composed somewhere between 384–379 BC),162 or mentions 
of Diomedes and Glaukos together before Aristotle, it is tempting to 
 
161 Malabou 2012, passim. In her essay Malabou (14–18) cites examples from Ovid and 
Kafka as non-total examples of metamorphoses, or ontological change: her argument, 
that the person changed still retains their inner life, is convincing, and in our example 
of Demeter above, is clearly applicable as Demeter does not lose her inner life during 
either change. The concept of possession does, however, I think, pose problems for the 
interpretation Malabou offers: she considers merely instances of trauma which result 
in permanent change, a change from which there is no return, but in instances of 
possession in the Iliad, the characters seem to suffer no characterological change 
afterward, but during the possession do lose control of both their body (and mind, if 
we read this from a dualist perspective). 
162 Dover 1980: 10. 
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speculate that the passage crept into the poem at a later date.163 Of 
course, since there is no sustained tradition of referencing the line or 
characters after Plato and Aristotle, it is not implausible that the scene 
was simply not mentioned in literature in general.164 Our second 
recourse is to explain the passage’s deviant language with an appeal to 
internal poetic aesthetics, on the assumption that the lines are part of a 
traditional story and have meaning within the poem. This approach, I 
think, allows us for a profitable re-reading of the scene.  
 The recent work of both Derek Collins and Alex Purves provides 
readings of other scenes which highlight the ontological change 
resultant from the use of armour. In Immortal Armor, Collins advances 
the argument that the wearing of armour, especially in the passage cited 
above (Il. 17.190–191) in which Hektor equips himself with the armour 
of the slain Patroklos (the armour is, of course, genealogically connected 
to the gods: it was fashioned by Hephaistos, given to Peleus on his 
 
163 See, e.g. Seaford (1994: 338–344), who discusses the relatively later composition of 
Book 9, and a potential Athenian origin of Book 9, which shares language with 
Aeschylus. Aeschylus, however, does not use ameibô in the same way our passage does, 
but this is of course not proof that the verb was not used by that time to mean an 
exchange of goods between persons. It seems, however, clumsy to depart so far from 
the standard terminology of gifts and giving on behalf of a later poet. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that Aeschylus shares language with Homer, instead of the other way 
around. 
164 This lack of literary trace seems to call into question Calder’s (1984: 31) quote from 
above implying that the expression was common or current. Of course, the passage 
might have been cited in works which do not survive, but if it were common, we might 
expect it to appear more than twice in the extant sources.  
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wedding day as a gift, and then given by Peleus to Achilles, before it is 
lent to Patroklos), results in a religious possession, and in Hektor’s case, 
possession by Ares:  
 
          …δῦ δε μιν Ἄρης 
Δεινὸς ἐνυάλιος, πλῆσθεν δ᾽ ἄρα οἱ μέλε᾽ ἐντὸς 
ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος.  
Il. 17.210–212 
 
          …and Ares entered him, 
The terrible war-like one, and inside him, his limbs were filled 
With alkê and sthenos.165 
 
As Collins continues, “once a divinity is inside a person, he is thought 
to lose consciousness of self, his self-awareness, and the divinity is 
believed to work through him.”166 This possession-by-armour is 
precisely an ontological change—the ‘host’, in this case Hektor, is no 
longer himself. Collins believes that this phenomenon of possession-by-
armour is implicit in instances during which it is not narrated, and that 
it was a common cultic acceptance in Archaic Greece. He argues that 
 
165 Both Greek terms, alkê and sthenos, are left untranslated here, as they both mean 
‘force’, but each term has a slightly different meaning: Benveniste 2016: 361 defines 
alkê as spiritual force’ and sthenos as ‘physical force’. See in general Benveniste 2016: 
361–371 and Stocking (forthcoming) for discussion of force-terms in Homer. 
166 Collins 1998: 17.  
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Patroklos disobeys the warning Achilles gives167 because in putting on 
Achilles’ armour, he is possessed and undergoes the same sort of 
ontological change as is explicitly narrated of Hektor (Il. 17.210ff).168 
Thus, for Collins, donning armour is an act which is equal to an 
ontological change of the self in the poetics of Homeric epic (and also 
perhaps in the real world): one becomes possessed and acted through.  
In addition to this possession proposed by Collins, we can argue that 
the equipping of armour results in another sort of ontological change: 
one where the person and armour become a unified whole, rather than 
merely conjoined subject and an object. Alex Purves, in her recent article 
“Ajax and Other Objects: Homer’s Vibrant Materialism”, writes “that 
for Homeric heroes, and for Ajax in particular, there is a special sense in 
which arms and body can merge, allowing for a moving boundary 
between inner and outer self, as well as between human and nonhuman 
materials.”169 Melissa Mueller, in discussing the epic hero “as a perfectly 
blended person-weapon,” cites Geometric vase painters’ tendency to 
depict warriors’ bodies as shields as visual evidence of this blending of  
person and arms, whereby “warriors are their weapons.”170 In these 
 
167 At Il. 16.83–87 Achilles tells Patroklos only to drive the Trojans from the Greek 
ships and not to pursue combat after that is accomplished.  
168 Collins 1998: 36. 
169 Purves 2015: 83–84. 
170 Mueller 2016: 34–35; her italics.  
 
 
103 
views, when a Homeric warrior puts on his armour, he undergoes a 
change which results in his body and arms becoming part of one another 
in a unified whole. In essence, he becomes something else. 
Furthermore, putting on armour can result in another type of change 
in the person: one in which they effectively become someone else. This 
change of identity is most clearly visible in Patroklos, who asks for 
Achilles’ armour so that the “Trojans imagine me to be you” (Il. 16.41–
42 “ἐμέ σοὶ ἴσκοντες… | Τρῶες”),171 thereby evincing fear in the Trojans 
and hope in the Greeks, upon whom a great “grief has fallen” (Il. 16.22 
“τοῖον γὰρ ἄχος βεβίηκεν Ἀχαιούς”). This impersonation is even able to 
result in Achilles receiving the timê (honour in the form of goods) and 
kudos (glory) for Patroklos’ deeds while in the armour (Il. 16.83–85), 
suggesting that for this purpose Patroklos does not just impersonate 
Achilles, but becomes him in the sense that Patroklos’ actions will be 
considered to be Achilles’. As Yamagata writes, “the idea of clothing as 
means of distinguishing different groups of people or individuals from 
one another is deeply embedded in Homer’s poetry.”172 Indeed, in the 
Odyssey, Odysseus’ clothing reflects his changing identity throughout 
 
171 The Greek iskontes is a participle, but due to the infelicities of English I have used 
a finite verb form. The original Greek includes a main verb (aposchontai ‘let them be 
kept at bay’) which is omitted here. 
172 Yamagata 2005: 539.  
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the poem.173 And in the Iliad, “the warrior’s identity is inseparably 
bound up with his armour,” suggesting that when Patroklos dons 
Achilles’ armour, he undergoes an identity shift. So, the use of 
(ep)aimebô in the Diomedes and Glaukos episode can be read as 
implying some sort of impending change in the participants. 
 When we direct our attention away from the verb and onto the object 
of exchange in the episode, we are faced with a second problem. We are 
told that Diomedes and Glaukos exchange with one another full 
panoplies of armour (Il. 6.235). When we consider all gifts given between 
mortals, we realise that the repertoire of martial gifts given does not 
include panoplies. As Donlan writes, in addition to belts, martial gifts 
given by mortals consist “of swords, breastplates, spears, or bows.”174 The 
only instances of full panoplies being given as gifts are from the gods. 
Achilles’ original set of armour, in which Patroklos went to his death, 
was given by the gods to Peleus on the occasion of his marriage to Thetis 
(Il. 18.82–85). Achilles refers to the set of armour explicitly as a gift (dôra, 
Il. 18.84) in this passage.175 The second instance of a set of armour being 
given as a gift is at the opening of Book 19: Thetis herself comes bearing 
 
173 Yamagata 2005: 540. 
174 Donlan 1989: 11.  
175 Interestingly at Il. 17.192–197, the narrator does not explicitly call the armour a gift 
given to Peleus nor mention the occasion on which it was given.  
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the gifts of the god (ἳκανε θεοῦ πάρα δῶρα φέρουσα, Il. 18.3), by which 
the panoply made by Hephaistos in the previous Book is meant.176 
Furthermore, whenever the poet refers to a set of armour as a gift, either 
in embedded speech or in narratorial voice, the referent is only ever god-
given panoplies (Il. 19.368; 20.268).177 Not only does the passage lack a 
traditional gift giving verb, but also a traditional gift! 
 Having shown that the episode between Diomedes and Glaukos is, 
contra current interpretations, not simply an instance of gift giving, the 
question remains: what, then, is the scene supposed to be? I believe we 
might look to instances of armour changing hands between mortals for 
an answer: the practice of stripping a defeated opponent’s armour, which 
is by far the most common method in the Iliad by which panoplies 
change hands. This practice is essentially one of exchange: the victor of 
the fight, as a token of the timê he has earned by virtue of besting his 
 
176 Canevaro (2018: 53) writes, “notably, though Hephaistos creates gifts, he is never 
emphasized as the giver.” She notes (2018:53) that it is Thetis who gives Achilles the 
armour he has made and Hera who offers to give Hypnos a throne made by 
Hephaistos.  
177 Graziosi and Haubold (2010: ad loc.) comment that this gold panoply might be the 
reason for Diomedes’ asking whether he was addressing a god or not; for gold armour 
is divine and thus perhaps a gift from Hephaistos (following the scholia, which calls 
the armour of Glaukos Ἡφαιστότευκτα: ΣT ad 6.234b1). Problematic for this theory is 
that when the poem makes mention of Achilles’ armour, its divine origins are recorded 
(e.g. Il. 18.83–84; 19.3, 18, 367; 20.265, 268; 21.165, 594). One would think that the 
divinity of the armour would have likewise been recorded in this instance if it were 
true. Thus, I believe that the armour only seems to be divine, rather than being actually 
divine.    
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opponent, is afforded the right to strip the slain enemy of his armour. 
In so doing, the victor is able both to increase his material possessions 
and his honour. It is understood that the victor will abide by the ethical 
expectations of a hero (within the poem, at least—for there is no 
evidence that this heroic ‘ideal’ was universally accepted by all Greeks 
living at some point during the formation of the Iliad) and allow the 
slain opponent to be afforded the proper funeral rites. This ethical 
custom is made explicit by Hektor: 
 
ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε δεῦρο θεοὺς ἐπιδώμεθα: τοὶ γὰρ ἄριστοι 
μάρτυροι ἔσσονται καὶ ἐπίσκοποι ἁρμονιάων· 
οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ σ᾽ ἔκπαγλον ἀεικιῶ, αἴ κεν ἐμοὶ Ζεὺς 
δώῃ καμμονίην, σὴν δὲ ψυχὴν ἀφέλωμαι· 
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ ἄρ κέ σε συλήσω κλυτὰ τεύχε᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ 
νεκρὸν Ἀχαιοῖσιν δώσω πάλιν· ὣς δὲ σὺ ῥέζειν. 
Il. 22.254–259 
 
“but come, let us take as witnesses the gods here: for they will 
be 
The best witnesses and observers of [our] agreements. 
For I will not treat you, violent one, unjustly, if Zeus gives 
Me victory and I take away your life-force. 
But after I strip you of your famous armour, Achilles, 
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I will give back your corpse to the Achaeans. Do you promise 
likewise?”178 
 
This passage, spoken between the bitterest of enemies (at least from 
Achilles’ point of view; Hektor does not bear the same anger toward 
Achilles) makes it clear that there is an accepted ethical obligation 
between opposing combatants. And indeed, this ethical custom is 
observed throughout the Iliad, except in the notable instance of this 
passage, in which Achilles, shortly before killing and defiling Hektor’s 
body (Il. 22.367–404), rejects the offer extended by Hektor (Il. 22.261–
272).179  
To be sure, the scene does affirm and exemplify the duty, which those 
bound by xenia must obey, of friendship and its hierarchical place in a 
scale of ethics: the bond clearly is superior to the dissolution of bonds 
 
178 One also thinks of Il. 17.201ff where Zeus makes a comment that Hektor should 
not have taken (Il. 17.205, ou kata kosmon) the armour of slain Patroklοs. But this 
instance, however, is exceptional since the armour is a divine possession which did not 
belong to Patroklos, and so is technically not his to lose. Furthermore, in this scene we 
can read that the implication of stripping one’s enemy’s armour is perhaps something 
based in merit. In this case, Hektor gains possession of Achilles’ armour, the armour 
of a man whom he did not best, and therefore, armour which he does not merit. 
179 Achilles’ rejection of this custom is likely rooted in his rejection of humanity 
brought about by the death of Patroklos. Not long before this, the narrator employs 
an animalistic simile to describe Achilles, likening him to a dog (Il. 22.189–193), and 
in his response to Hektor’s request (Il. 22.254–259), Achilles himself employs an 
animalistic simile (Il. 22.260–265). This descent into the animalistic is most expressed 
in Achilles᾽ desire to eat Hektor’s flesh raw (Il. 22.346–347). 
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brought about by war.180 Of course, this does not explain the language 
of the passage, but merely reduces it to its socio-political function. I 
argue that what seems to be happening in this passage is a deception—
a deception which takes place on two levels. On the one hand, the poet 
of the text structures the episode so that it mimics, though not exactly, 
the conventional literary representation of guest-host type-scenes. 
When the two heroes meet, “what ensues…is a dialogue that seems 
perhaps more fitting in a hospitality scene. For Diomedes’ inquiry after 
Glaukos’ name is the first question a host asks of his guest.”181 Especially 
troubling, however, for a literal interpretation of the episode as a banal 
hospitality scene transplanted from the home to the battlefield,182 is that 
these type-scenes, “including… gift giving” are “all composed in highly 
formulaic diction.”183 What this means, I believe, is that, on the one 
 
180 We might compare this episode to the gifts of Hektor and Aias, who exchange with 
one another gifts at the end of their duel and part in friendship, “en philotêti” (Il. 7.299–
302). Notably, however, Aias and Hektor return to fighting one another after they give 
gifts to one another (see Ch. 2) 
181 Newton 2009: 59–60. Reece 1993: ch.1 discusses at length the conventions of 
Homeric hospitality scenes.  
182 Newton 2009: 61 describes the battlefield as a metaphorical house of Diomedes: 
“Glaukos has entered Diomedes’ house, identified here as the space between the armies 
in which Diomedes has been freely ranging. Exceptionally eager for a fight, Glaukos 
has burst into this zone and stands at the threshold of Diomedes’ domain.” Writing 
on Virginia Woolf, Simone (2017: 95) writes that “as a guest requires as host, which 
in turn implies some sense of ownership of place,” further suggesting that the 
battlefield can be conceived as being symbolically (or really) owned by Diomedes 
during his aristeia.  
183 Reece 1993: 5. Even though Reece argues for the highly formulaic language of these 
type-scenes, he includes teuchea, illustrated by our deviant scene, as an example of a 
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hand, the loose adherence to the literary conventions, and on the other 
hand, the unformulaic language which appears at precisely the height of 
this scene signal that we are not in fact dealing with a transposed-but-
conventional hospitality scene. Instead, Diomedes, by exploiting the 
accidental (to him, but surely not to the poet) encounter with and 
recognition of an enemy with whom he shares a two-generation-old 
bond of xenia, is able to initiate a symbolic procedure of armour 
stripping.  
 This process of symbolic armour stripping is brought about by a 
number of factors. As mentioned above, full panoplies are only given as 
gifts by gods and described as gifts by characters and narrator if they 
were god-given. The most common method by which panoplies change 
hands between mortals in the Iliad is by stripping a defeated enemy in 
battle. Since this practice of armour stripping is economic,184 the 
narrator’s comments at Il. 6.234 can be understood as the reaction to the 
solely real (i.e. not symbolic) economic side of this episode. 
That the superior warrior wins the armour of his opponent suggests 
that Diomedes and Glaukos part as equals, given that they each get to 
 
guest-gift (Reece 1993: 36). Furthermore, it should be noted that even though Reece 
cites this example as a guest-gift, he does not include this scene itself as a metaphorical 
guest-host scene. 
184 Armour stripping participates in both real and symbolic economy: the victor wins a 
valuable metal, as well as the symbolic capital attendant to his being victorious in 
battle.  
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participate in the symbolic stripping of the other. Indeed, as we have 
seen, it is made clear in the text that warriors will only use armour that 
reflects their own martial ability (i.e. good warriors will not use armour 
that is beneath their status). In changing into the armour of the other, 
Diomedes and Glaukos admit non-verbally that they are at least equals, 
or that they view each other as better than themselves.   
In this case, contrary to critics’ fixation upon who came out the 
symbolic victor of this exchange, we are left with a stalemate. (Or else, 
each participant believes the other to be better, suggesting a subjective 
hierarchy rather than the objective one needed to assert that one of the 
two is the ‘victor’). Both participants in the episode leave with timê, they 
each obtain the armour of their enemy-turned-friend, which can be seen 
as a declaration of martial equality, as well, given that the wearing of 
armour, as we saw above, seems to be linked with a sense of merit. Does 
Diomedes have more timê simply because the armour he stripped is 
more monetarily valuable? Does Glaukos ‘win’ because his prize is from 
one of the foremost Greek warriors, one who was able to wound a god? 
Indeed, Diomedes is the Greek who is most active, killing the highest 
number of men in the poem. Ultimately, I believe that this reading of 
the scene adds to the understanding of the episode: we should not argue 
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that it is only a gift giving scene. Rather, through a close reading of the 
scene’s language, we are able to add dimension to our reading.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
hat I hope to have shown in the three chapters above is 
that the study of the gift in the Iliad (and in Homeric 
poetry in general) does not support the current 
structuralist theories or does not allow for a strict structuralist 
interpretation. In the first chapter, I illustrated how an approach which 
aims to show that the language of the poem is reflective of the idea that 
gifts given in certain situations were marked by language. I introduced 
the argument that the specific words were not indicative of a solidified 
idea of different forms of gift, but rather were aesthetic, used to 
highlight a significant scene. For instance, when the poet uses a non-
standard word (i.e. another word than dôron) for a gift, the effect, as the 
Russian Formalists argued, would serve to draw the audience toward the 
scene for being different.  
 In the second chapter, I showed that the idea of a universal 
understanding of the gift in the Iliad seems to be incompatible with the 
standard theories of the gift, which argues either that gifts are truly freely 
given or at least believed to be freely given by the participants of the 
W 
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exchange, which differentiates gifts from outright economic 
transactions.  
 In the final chapter, I applied the conclusions from the previous 
chapters in a close reading of the Diomedes and Glaukos episode in 
Book 6. By being attendant to the language of the scene, I showed that 
it is different from every other instance of gift giving in the Iliad. By 
comparing the scene’s language with other similar language, I argued 
for a novel reading of the scene which adds to the interpretation of the 
problematic exchange. 
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